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Let's say God knows today what shirt I will wear tomorrow. He comes and tells you, "Tomorrow, Tiberius is going to wear the Blue shirt." Now, because he's God, there's no way he can be wrong. That means, whatever happens, I have to wear the blue shirt. So, tomorrow morning, is it possible for...

Let's say God knows today what shirt I will wear tomorrow. He comes and tells you, "Tomorrow, Tiberius is going to wear the Blue shirt." Now, because he's God, there's no way he can be wrong. That means, whatever happens, I have to wear the blue shirt. So, tomorrow morning, is it possible for...

Okay, so let's address it now. Does God have 100% accurate knowledge about my future actions? Yes or no? That's missing the point. Let's say God knows today what shirt I will wear tomorrow. He comes and tells you, "Tomorrow, Tiberius is going to wear the Blue shirt." Now, because he's God...

So God is ignorant and apathetic?

And in such a case, would I be able to want to wear the blue shirt if God has always know that I would NOT want to wear it? All these arguments seem to be nothing but a dressed-up way of saying, "Yeah, I always knew you were going to do that thing you just did."

Why do people always think that the entity that has the knowledge is the one forcing a particular outcome? I never said that. If God knows what I will wear tomorrow, then I have no choice in the matter because of the existence of the knowledge, not some action by God.

You mean what you said back in post 1174? Because I responded to that in post 1178. When absolutely accurate 100% guaranteed knowledge of the future is available, then there is no free choice. Free choice requires more than one option to be available.

No, because God KNOWS. In a universe where I will wear the Blue shirt, God has known that I will wear the blue shirt since the beginning of time and everything. There is no way for me to avoid wearing the blue shirt. Hence, I have no free will.

If God knows I will not choose the red shirt, how is the red shirt an available option to me?

Okay, then please tell me, if it is 100% predetermined that I will wear the blue shirt, then how do I have the free will to wear the red shirt? Because it seems to me that "predetermined", which includes that word "determined," means that the outcome was "determined" before I was in a position...

How so? There's a huge IF there. IF 100% accurate knowledge of my future actions is possible, then I don't have free will. If this, then that.

You are contradicting yourself. You say there isn't just ONE possible outcome, but God knows which ONE I will pick. I remember hearing that old cars used to be available in black only. And at the time, people would say, "You can have any colour you want, as long as it's black." What you are...

I'd like to propose that "deterministic" means that if you have 100% information about the universe at a point in time, then it is possible to determine what state the universe will be in at any later point in time. For example, if you knew absolutely everything there was to know about the...

The idea that any entity (God or otherwise) could have 100% accurate knowledge of my future actions in every detail is indeed mutually incompatible with free will. If God knows today that my chances of wearing the red shirt tomorrow are 100%, then me "deciding" what shirt to wear tomorrow does...

Incorrect, there are multiple something it could be, and it won't be set until I actually make the choice. What point are you trying to make?

I define free will as being a situation where there are multiple options, each of which has a non-zero probability of being chosen. So, if I have the option of two shirts, a red one and a blue one, and the probabilities for them being chosen are 30% for red and 70% for blue, then I have free...

I think you misunderstand what my position is on this subject.

I think you misunderstand. I am not saying that it is the case that there is such a being. I am saying that IF there is such a being, then we can not have free will. It's a hypothetical. Again, you miss my point. If the entity knows today what I will wear tomorrow, then what I wear tomorrow...

So you're essentially arguing that a situation that is astronomically unlikely and would resolve itself almost instantly is proof against free will? Of course it's not identical. Even if it could retain all of your memories, it would be a different person as soon as it becomes self aware...

I don't see how this contributes anything to the discussion.