I have started plunging into a detailed analysis of Indian and Greek rationalism in THE UNTOLD STORY ABOUT GREEK RATIONAL THOUGHT, at
http://etd.lib.ttu.edu/theses/available/etd-07312008-31295015156333/unrestricted/31295015156333.pdf
. It is a boon finding such a detailed exposition of this kind on the very earliest known skeptics, and I'm grateful that there is such a valuable survey. I find it impossible to put down, and I hope to finish it in a couple of days.
One aspect of early Indian rationalism that continues to perplex me is the continuing inconsistency(?) with which different scholars seem to characterize the apparent stance of Buddha himself when it comes to the precise extent to which Buddha adopts (or doesn't) the Skeptic outlook on the validity (or its lack) of the metaphysical. Different specialists give different and varied assessments of Buddha's outlook in this regard.
I suppose the most sensible approach is simply to peruse the earliest Pali texts themselves in assessing the extent to which Buddha fully reflects the Indian Rationalist take on Hindu orthodoxy and on the metaphysical generally. However, even doing that results in apparent contradictions:
On the one hand, on page 243 of this online survey on rational thought, in the chapter "Indian Empiricism and Positivism and Protagoras' Theory of Knowledge", the author cites the following dialogue:
Just, Vasettha, as if a man shouId say, "How I long for, how I love the
most beautiful woman in this land!" And people would ask him, "Well!
Good friend! This most beautiful woman in the land, whom you thus love
and long for, do you know whether that beautiful woman is a noble lady,
or a Brahman woman, or of the trader class, or a Shudra?" But when so
asked, he should answer, "No" And when people should ask him, "Well!
Good friend! This most beautiful woman in all the land, whom you so
love and long for, do you know what the name of that most beautiful
woman is, or what is her family name, whether she be tall, or short, or
medium height, dark, brunette, or golden in color, or in what village or
town or city she dwells?" But when so asked, he should answer, "No!"
And then people should say to him, "So, then, good friend, whom you
know not, neither have seen, her do you love and long for?" And then
when so asked, he should answer: "Yes."
"Now what think you, Vasettha? Would it not tum out, that being so, to
be that the talk of that man was fooIish talk?"
"In sooth, Gotama, it would tora out, that being so, that the tahc of that
man was foolish talk!"
"And Just even so, Vasettha, though you say that the Brahmins are not
able to point out the way to union with that which they have seen, and you
further say that neither any one of them, nor of their pupils, nor of their
predecessors even to the seventh generation has ever seen Brahma. And
you further say that even the Rishis of old, whose words they hold in such
deep respect, did not pretend to know, or to have seen where, or whence,
or whither Brahma is. Yet these Brahmans, versed in the Three Vedas, say
forsooth, that they can point out the way to union with that which they
know not, neither have seen! Now what think you, Vasettha? Does it not
follow that, this being so, the talk of the Brahmans, versed though they be
in the Three Vedas, is FooIish talk?"
"In sooth, Gotama, that being so, it follows that the talk of the Brahmans
versed in the Three Vedas is foolish tahc!'"
This would certainly bear out the notion that Buddha is being practically as skeptical as Braspati, the founder of ancient Indian materialism. In a footnote, this survey gives the source of this dialogue as "Dialogues of the Buddha I, pp. 307-308.". (Unfortunately, I do not appear to have access to this volume right now, so I cannot ascertain, by name, which Sutta this dialogue comes from; I'd love to know, and which collection this comes from, and if it's a collection that most scholars view as contemporary with the Digha-Nikaya or later.)
On the other hand, in the collection generally viewed as the earliest Sutta collection in the Pali canon, the Digha-Nikaya, there is the Tevijja Sutta (no. 13), in which this exchange appears:
40. Then the Blessed One spake, and said:
Know, V¤seÂÂha, that (from time to time) a Tath¤gata is born into the world, an Arahat, a fully awakened one, abounding, in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge of the worlds, unsurpassed as a guide to mortals willing to be led, a teacher of gods and men, a Blessed One, a Buddha. He, by himself, thoroughly understands, and sees, as it were, face to face this universe -- including the worlds above with the gods, the M¤ras, and the Brahm¤s; and the world below with its Sama¼as and Brahmans, its princes and peoples; -- and he then makes his knowledge known to others. The truth doth he proclaim both in the letter and in the spirit, lovely in its origin, lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation: the higher life doth he make known, in all its purity and in all its perfectness. <SNIP>
77. 'Just, V¤seÂÂha, as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard-and that without difficulty-in all the four directions; even so of all things that have shape or life, there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free, and deep-felt love.
'Verily this, V¤seÂÂha, is the way to a state of union with Brahm¤.
78. 'And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of pity, ... sympathy, equanimity, and so the second, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, above, below, around, and everywhere, does he continue to pervade with heart of pity. . . . sympathy, . . . equanimity, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure.
79. 'Just, V¤seÂÂha, as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard -- and that without difficulty -- in all the four directions ; even so of all things that have shape or life, there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free, and deep-felt pity, ... sympathy, ... equanimity.
'Verily this, V¤seÂÂha, is the way to a state of union with Brahm¤.'
80. 'Now what think you, V¤seÂÂha, will the Bhikkhu who lives thus be in possession of women and of wealth, or will he not?'
'He will not, Gotama!'
'Will he be full of anger, or free from anger?'
'He will be free from anger, Gotama!'
'Will his mind be full of malice, or free from malice?'
'Free from malice, Gotama!'
'Will his mind be tarnished, or pure?'
'It will be pure, Gotama!'
'Will he have self-mastery, or will he not?'
'Surely he will, Gotama!'
81 'Then you say, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu is free from household and worldly cares, and that Brahm¤ is free from household and worldly cares. Is therethen agreement and likeness between the Bhikkhu and Brahm¤?'
'There is, Gotama!
Very good, V¤seÂÂha. Then in sooth, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu who is free from household cares should after death, when the body is dissolved, become united with Brahm¤, who is the same -- such a condition of things is every way possible!
'And so you say, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu is free from anger, and free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself; and that Brahm¤ is free from anger, and free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself. Then in sooth, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu who is free from anger, free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself should after death, when the body is dissolved, become united with Brahm¤, who is the same-such a condition of things is every way possible!'
To me -- and I may be missing something here? -- this exchange appears to take the notion of Brahma as being -- at least -- something that is given _some_ credit to _some_ extent, if not necessarily conceived in the exact same way that an orthodox Brahmin of that day might have viewed Brahma. Such seems not the case(?) with the skeptical exchange cited on page 243. A contradiction here? Please, I'd be very curious to know which collection the Sutta cited on page 243 is from, and how do most scholars view that collection, chronologically, compared to the Digha-Nikaya? (Since I do not currently have access to my translation of the Digha-Nikaya (it's in storage right now), I'm ready for the possible shock of finding out that the exchange cited on page 243 is also from the Digha-Nikaya!
I would be grateful for any light anyone here can throw on this question and on the apparent contradiction that these contrasting exchanges appear to pose concerning Buddha's own outlook as best we can determine.
Many thanks,
Operacast
http://etd.lib.ttu.edu/theses/available/etd-07312008-31295015156333/unrestricted/31295015156333.pdf
. It is a boon finding such a detailed exposition of this kind on the very earliest known skeptics, and I'm grateful that there is such a valuable survey. I find it impossible to put down, and I hope to finish it in a couple of days.
One aspect of early Indian rationalism that continues to perplex me is the continuing inconsistency(?) with which different scholars seem to characterize the apparent stance of Buddha himself when it comes to the precise extent to which Buddha adopts (or doesn't) the Skeptic outlook on the validity (or its lack) of the metaphysical. Different specialists give different and varied assessments of Buddha's outlook in this regard.
I suppose the most sensible approach is simply to peruse the earliest Pali texts themselves in assessing the extent to which Buddha fully reflects the Indian Rationalist take on Hindu orthodoxy and on the metaphysical generally. However, even doing that results in apparent contradictions:
On the one hand, on page 243 of this online survey on rational thought, in the chapter "Indian Empiricism and Positivism and Protagoras' Theory of Knowledge", the author cites the following dialogue:
Just, Vasettha, as if a man shouId say, "How I long for, how I love the
most beautiful woman in this land!" And people would ask him, "Well!
Good friend! This most beautiful woman in the land, whom you thus love
and long for, do you know whether that beautiful woman is a noble lady,
or a Brahman woman, or of the trader class, or a Shudra?" But when so
asked, he should answer, "No" And when people should ask him, "Well!
Good friend! This most beautiful woman in all the land, whom you so
love and long for, do you know what the name of that most beautiful
woman is, or what is her family name, whether she be tall, or short, or
medium height, dark, brunette, or golden in color, or in what village or
town or city she dwells?" But when so asked, he should answer, "No!"
And then people should say to him, "So, then, good friend, whom you
know not, neither have seen, her do you love and long for?" And then
when so asked, he should answer: "Yes."
"Now what think you, Vasettha? Would it not tum out, that being so, to
be that the talk of that man was fooIish talk?"
"In sooth, Gotama, it would tora out, that being so, that the tahc of that
man was foolish talk!"
"And Just even so, Vasettha, though you say that the Brahmins are not
able to point out the way to union with that which they have seen, and you
further say that neither any one of them, nor of their pupils, nor of their
predecessors even to the seventh generation has ever seen Brahma. And
you further say that even the Rishis of old, whose words they hold in such
deep respect, did not pretend to know, or to have seen where, or whence,
or whither Brahma is. Yet these Brahmans, versed in the Three Vedas, say
forsooth, that they can point out the way to union with that which they
know not, neither have seen! Now what think you, Vasettha? Does it not
follow that, this being so, the talk of the Brahmans, versed though they be
in the Three Vedas, is FooIish talk?"
"In sooth, Gotama, that being so, it follows that the talk of the Brahmans
versed in the Three Vedas is foolish tahc!'"
This would certainly bear out the notion that Buddha is being practically as skeptical as Braspati, the founder of ancient Indian materialism. In a footnote, this survey gives the source of this dialogue as "Dialogues of the Buddha I, pp. 307-308.". (Unfortunately, I do not appear to have access to this volume right now, so I cannot ascertain, by name, which Sutta this dialogue comes from; I'd love to know, and which collection this comes from, and if it's a collection that most scholars view as contemporary with the Digha-Nikaya or later.)
On the other hand, in the collection generally viewed as the earliest Sutta collection in the Pali canon, the Digha-Nikaya, there is the Tevijja Sutta (no. 13), in which this exchange appears:
40. Then the Blessed One spake, and said:
Know, V¤seÂÂha, that (from time to time) a Tath¤gata is born into the world, an Arahat, a fully awakened one, abounding, in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge of the worlds, unsurpassed as a guide to mortals willing to be led, a teacher of gods and men, a Blessed One, a Buddha. He, by himself, thoroughly understands, and sees, as it were, face to face this universe -- including the worlds above with the gods, the M¤ras, and the Brahm¤s; and the world below with its Sama¼as and Brahmans, its princes and peoples; -- and he then makes his knowledge known to others. The truth doth he proclaim both in the letter and in the spirit, lovely in its origin, lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation: the higher life doth he make known, in all its purity and in all its perfectness. <SNIP>
77. 'Just, V¤seÂÂha, as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard-and that without difficulty-in all the four directions; even so of all things that have shape or life, there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free, and deep-felt love.
'Verily this, V¤seÂÂha, is the way to a state of union with Brahm¤.
78. 'And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of pity, ... sympathy, equanimity, and so the second, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, above, below, around, and everywhere, does he continue to pervade with heart of pity. . . . sympathy, . . . equanimity, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure.
79. 'Just, V¤seÂÂha, as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard -- and that without difficulty -- in all the four directions ; even so of all things that have shape or life, there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free, and deep-felt pity, ... sympathy, ... equanimity.
'Verily this, V¤seÂÂha, is the way to a state of union with Brahm¤.'
80. 'Now what think you, V¤seÂÂha, will the Bhikkhu who lives thus be in possession of women and of wealth, or will he not?'
'He will not, Gotama!'
'Will he be full of anger, or free from anger?'
'He will be free from anger, Gotama!'
'Will his mind be full of malice, or free from malice?'
'Free from malice, Gotama!'
'Will his mind be tarnished, or pure?'
'It will be pure, Gotama!'
'Will he have self-mastery, or will he not?'
'Surely he will, Gotama!'
81 'Then you say, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu is free from household and worldly cares, and that Brahm¤ is free from household and worldly cares. Is therethen agreement and likeness between the Bhikkhu and Brahm¤?'
'There is, Gotama!
Very good, V¤seÂÂha. Then in sooth, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu who is free from household cares should after death, when the body is dissolved, become united with Brahm¤, who is the same -- such a condition of things is every way possible!
'And so you say, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu is free from anger, and free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself; and that Brahm¤ is free from anger, and free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself. Then in sooth, V¤seÂÂha, that the Bhikkhu who is free from anger, free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself should after death, when the body is dissolved, become united with Brahm¤, who is the same-such a condition of things is every way possible!'
To me -- and I may be missing something here? -- this exchange appears to take the notion of Brahma as being -- at least -- something that is given _some_ credit to _some_ extent, if not necessarily conceived in the exact same way that an orthodox Brahmin of that day might have viewed Brahma. Such seems not the case(?) with the skeptical exchange cited on page 243. A contradiction here? Please, I'd be very curious to know which collection the Sutta cited on page 243 is from, and how do most scholars view that collection, chronologically, compared to the Digha-Nikaya? (Since I do not currently have access to my translation of the Digha-Nikaya (it's in storage right now), I'm ready for the possible shock of finding out that the exchange cited on page 243 is also from the Digha-Nikaya!
I would be grateful for any light anyone here can throw on this question and on the apparent contradiction that these contrasting exchanges appear to pose concerning Buddha's own outlook as best we can determine.
Many thanks,
Operacast
s*