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Shibolet
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The Absolute Unity of God
Isaiah says that, absolutely, God cannot be compared with anyone or anything, as we read. "To whom will ye liken Me, and make Me equal to , or compare Me with, that we may be alike?"
Therefore, more than one God would have been unable to produce the world; one would have impeded the work of the other, unless this could be avoided by a suitable division of labor.
More than one Divine Being would have one element in common, and would differ in another; each would thus consist of two elements, and would not be God.
More than one God are moved to action by will; the will, without a substratum, could not act simultaneously in more than one being.
Therefore, the existence of one God is proved; the existence of more than one God cannot be proved. One could suggest that it would be possible; but since as possibility is inapplicable to God, there does not exist more than one God. So, the possibility of ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with potentiality of existence.
Again, if one God suffices, a second or third God would be superfluous; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and cannot be a deity.
Now, besides being God absolutely One, He is incorporeal. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and would not be one; or he would be comparable to other beings; but a comparison implies the existence of similar and of dissimilar elements, and God would thus not be One. A corporeal God would be finite, and an external power would be required to define those limits.
Isaiah says that, absolutely, God cannot be compared with anyone or anything, as we read. "To whom will ye liken Me, and make Me equal to , or compare Me with, that we may be alike?"
Therefore, more than one God would have been unable to produce the world; one would have impeded the work of the other, unless this could be avoided by a suitable division of labor.
More than one Divine Being would have one element in common, and would differ in another; each would thus consist of two elements, and would not be God.
More than one God are moved to action by will; the will, without a substratum, could not act simultaneously in more than one being.
Therefore, the existence of one God is proved; the existence of more than one God cannot be proved. One could suggest that it would be possible; but since as possibility is inapplicable to God, there does not exist more than one God. So, the possibility of ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with potentiality of existence.
Again, if one God suffices, a second or third God would be superfluous; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and cannot be a deity.
Now, besides being God absolutely One, He is incorporeal. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and would not be one; or he would be comparable to other beings; but a comparison implies the existence of similar and of dissimilar elements, and God would thus not be One. A corporeal God would be finite, and an external power would be required to define those limits.