Thomas,
The point is that change signifies a cause that brings about the change — but as God is above time, nothing happens that is 'new' in that regard, so God was disposed to every event in creation from the very beginning.
The line of argument is familiar. Unfortunately, the basic assumption you are making that G-d is above time is a problematic view.
I'm arguing the God of the philosophers, and then some.
Yes, and then some..... Let's see where this ends up.
An Immutable, unchanging G-d would not relate to Creation in an immanental and sympathetic way. But if you accept Biblical revelation, you must agree that He has been relating to Creation that way. On that basis, one must conclude that G-d cannot be immutable. You have tried to get around this inevitable implication by suggesting that divine intervention (i.e., the Incarnation and Atonement) did not change G-d's nature. I would say that G-d could have avoided changing by not effectuating the special intervention.
In fact, one implication of the position you seem to be arguing is that G-d did not benefit from any of the covenants He made, nor did He benefit from the Atonement by which humans were reconciled to Him. That being the case, the Biblical rendering of G-d as taking an interest in His children would have to be considered false. Surprisingly, you seem to be fine with this implication!
It's puzzling to me that anyone would maintain G-d's immutability when the Bible describes a G-d who is in fact dynamically relates and who is in fact continuously involved with His Creation. The Biblical G-d is a G-d of relatedness. When He interacts with the Israelites and develops new covenants, this represents the historical activity of an immanent and sympathetic deity.
The Incarnation represents a covenant, too - sometimes called the Covenant of Grace. The Incarnation is considered a singular event. It would have to have been an event that changed G-d because it modified the Trinity. A possible way around this is to assert that Jesus was not part of the Trinity.
I'm arguing the God of the philosophers ....
the God of the philosophers is characterized as immutable and in that regard He is different from the G-d of the Bible. You can see the Incarnation as proof that G-d is not immutable. Alternatively, in order to preserve His immutability, you can maintain that G-d is unresponsive even though this logically implies that there was no special Incarnation and that is Jesus was not G-d.
If you don' like the idea that Jesus wasn't G-d, you can try to explain the unacceptable conclusion away. You can assert that the Trinity and G-d's nature were unchanged by the Incarnation.. That is in fact your reply (Post #113): "the Divine manifests Itself according to the nature to whom it is manifesting ... But that does not change it's own nature." This position assumes that G-d's intentions vis a vis Creation and the Incarnational intervention itself are separate from G-d ontological status. In other words, maintaining G-d's immutability is not only inconsistent with what we know about G-d from revelation (the Bible); it also requires a convoluted philosophical theory that raise questions about the unity of G-d's being. The theory would seem to suggest that G-d takes actions, but somehow His actions don't affect His being.
In my post #186, I noted that divine intervention of the Incarnation involved " deviation" fom an "immutable/unconditioned mode" of divine power. Your reply was that a responsive G-d (i.e., the G-d of the Bible) would be a "finite deity". Recently, you assert a position in question form: "How can a nature limit anything that is unlimited and inconfinable?" (Post #379) This objection is a rejection of G-d's ongoing involvement with Creation (including divine intervention). The objection preserves G-d's immutability but it denies G-d's immanence in history. But denying the Incarnation is compatible with Christian theology. Arguably, rejection of the Incarnation implies a rejection of scriptural authority. In other words, acceptance of the philosopher's G-d causes an entire doctrinal edifice to go crashing down.
Ironically, with a certain enthusiasm, you say: "My argument with panentheism is philosophical, not theological. It's a matter of logic.....it's all the application of logic." What we are looking at here is an example if where logic takes you when your premises (e.g., an a prior of G-d's nature) ) is allowed to dictate a whole line of reasoning that takes us into the farthest reaches if irrelevance. In J. L. Mackie's words: "
If G-d and His actions are not in time, can omnipotence, or power of any sort, be meaningfully ascribed to Him?"
There's something to be said for using logic in the vainglorious hope of defending a concept of G-d as infinite and immutable only to argue for the existence of a "finite deity" who is either uncaring or, if He does care, chooses not to be involved in His Creation, that is, a G-d who doesn't even resemble the deity revealed in Scripture, and who is essentially irrelevant except maybe to bored philosophy students who, for some inexplicable reason prefer medieval church-based philosophers over more contemporary ones. Yes, no doubt there's something to be said for it...But other than being a source of entertainment for philosophy students who spend time creating logical absurdities for themselves, I'm not sure what it would be....
