On the question of apokatastasis —
Those who know me here will know my allegiance to Christian apophatic theology ... and might know that the Fathers to whom I refer on these matters: St John, St Paul, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the pseudoAreopagite, St Maximus the Confessor, Eriugena ... all held, to some degree, and idea of apokatastasis.
St Maximus, in Questiones et Dubia 19, commenting on the notion of apokatastasis as found in Gregory of Nyssa, who in turn was following Origen, writes that the Church knows or recognises three kinds of restoration:
The first meaning applies to the restoration of the individual through virtue; in this case restoration means the return to the primordial condition of man's goodness.
The second meaning applies to the restoration of the whole nature of man during the resurrection of bodies: the ontological condition of paradisal incorruptibility and immortality is restored.
The third, and here Maximos refers specifically to Gregory of Nyssa, applies to the restoration of the powers of the soul to the state they were created, before they were altered by sin.
To understand this, one needs to understand the idea of the free will of man, a question brought out in the Christological disputes which came to a head at the Council of Chalcedon (451), and continued afterwards with the disputes with the Nestorians and the Eutycheans, and the arguments regarding the divine and human nature of Christ that arose, such as monothelitism and monophysitism.
As Maximus was a champion both of the orthodox Christology, and the correction and restoration of the teachings of Origen and Evagrius, his theology is a useful access point to the idea of apokatastasis.
Above all, writers such as Maximus and Dionysius saw that carnal man would all too readily turn a doctrine into one of self-justification, and chose rather to "honour the truth by silence" than to let it fall into the distortions of the carnal mind.
Apokatastasis seems to suggest the annihilation of evil, because the effects of sin are healed. This will be achieved by the expulsion of evil from the souls in the continuation of the ages. All restored souls will come to know God and see that he is anaitios tês hamartias, not responsible for the existence of sin, which is the same as saying they will know the true nature of good and evil.
The "perverted" powers of the soul will then cast off the memories and the effect of evil, and in a way similar to the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, this involves a trial by fire, a punishment and/or purification.
St Maximus suggests that all souls will have a knowledge of "good things" (agatha), but not necessarily participation in them. Here we can see signs of something other than a universal restoration.
Irenaeus and other fathers talk of the rewards according to merit in this life, based on the Parable of the seeds, Matthew 13:8-9 "and they brought forth fruit, some an hundredfold, some sixtyfold, and some thirtyfold. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."
Salvation of all is not an ontological necessity, although it seems to be strongly suggested as the rational consequence of the restoration of the powers of the soul.
Maximus names the will as at least one of the powers of the soul that will be restored. Does that mean that gnomic will (the deliberative will particular to the fallen nature) will be transformed into natural will?
If so, and that seems most likely to be the case, this is the boldest statement in support of the apokatastasis that we can find in the writings of Maximos. How can it be possible not to repent and to beg for the forgiveness of God in the most profound and sincere way, once our will has been restored to the natural will which is subject to God's will?
St Maximus does not speculate beyond the moment when the human being has knowledge (epignosis) of God. This does not necessarily mean the participation in Him, simply knowledge of Him. That knowledge will, nevertheless, be 'entire' and 'complete' and 'perfect' according to the soul's attainment of virtue in this life.
Thus some will be close to God, and some will be distant; some a hundredfold, some sixtyfold, some thirtyfold, and again, in the 'many mansions', some will be close to the Temple that stands at the centre of the Celestial City, some will be at further remove ... but all will be at the place they should be, according to their attainment in this life, and all will be at the fullness of their being.
The question is, how can we understand the restoration of the natural will in the soul, with everything this entails about the passions and the tendency to sin?
Will it be possible for human, angelic and even demonic souls, at the moment of their bodily and psychic restoration, to repent, to be forgiven and be accepted in the kingdom of God (since they cast off their deliberative, gnomic will, and should be able to see the difference between good and evil), or will the return be restricted to the ones who repented during life on earth?
This is the big question.
If no repentence is possible, then what 'good' in in punishment? None. Then what is the point?
Either repentance is possible, and the 'pain' and 'torment' is in realising the truth, and how far shoert we have fallen of our potentiality ... so this is not a punishment inflicted by God, so much as a remorse at the realisation of a degree of error and self-will ... and contrition.
If repentence is not possible, then the judgement is final. Again, God does not inflict pain or torment, but rather the human soul has, by its own determination, consigned itself to non-reality; it has no place in the scheme of things, and the best biblical signifier of this state is gehenna — the place where those who have no place are disposed of ... the idea of flame, fire, torment, etc., is just the language of the volative will ... the reality is more frightening — the utter extinction of the soul.
This idea is unthinkable ... but the idea of a God who is the plaything of man, of man who can do what he likes in life because God will forgive him regardless, is equally irrational ...
So as long as man is free to accept God, he is free to deny Him, and if he is free to deny Him, there must be a logical consequence of that act.
Thomas
Those who know me here will know my allegiance to Christian apophatic theology ... and might know that the Fathers to whom I refer on these matters: St John, St Paul, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the pseudoAreopagite, St Maximus the Confessor, Eriugena ... all held, to some degree, and idea of apokatastasis.
St Maximus, in Questiones et Dubia 19, commenting on the notion of apokatastasis as found in Gregory of Nyssa, who in turn was following Origen, writes that the Church knows or recognises three kinds of restoration:
The first meaning applies to the restoration of the individual through virtue; in this case restoration means the return to the primordial condition of man's goodness.
The second meaning applies to the restoration of the whole nature of man during the resurrection of bodies: the ontological condition of paradisal incorruptibility and immortality is restored.
The third, and here Maximos refers specifically to Gregory of Nyssa, applies to the restoration of the powers of the soul to the state they were created, before they were altered by sin.
To understand this, one needs to understand the idea of the free will of man, a question brought out in the Christological disputes which came to a head at the Council of Chalcedon (451), and continued afterwards with the disputes with the Nestorians and the Eutycheans, and the arguments regarding the divine and human nature of Christ that arose, such as monothelitism and monophysitism.
As Maximus was a champion both of the orthodox Christology, and the correction and restoration of the teachings of Origen and Evagrius, his theology is a useful access point to the idea of apokatastasis.
Above all, writers such as Maximus and Dionysius saw that carnal man would all too readily turn a doctrine into one of self-justification, and chose rather to "honour the truth by silence" than to let it fall into the distortions of the carnal mind.
Apokatastasis seems to suggest the annihilation of evil, because the effects of sin are healed. This will be achieved by the expulsion of evil from the souls in the continuation of the ages. All restored souls will come to know God and see that he is anaitios tês hamartias, not responsible for the existence of sin, which is the same as saying they will know the true nature of good and evil.
The "perverted" powers of the soul will then cast off the memories and the effect of evil, and in a way similar to the thought of Gregory of Nyssa, this involves a trial by fire, a punishment and/or purification.
St Maximus suggests that all souls will have a knowledge of "good things" (agatha), but not necessarily participation in them. Here we can see signs of something other than a universal restoration.
Irenaeus and other fathers talk of the rewards according to merit in this life, based on the Parable of the seeds, Matthew 13:8-9 "and they brought forth fruit, some an hundredfold, some sixtyfold, and some thirtyfold. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."
Salvation of all is not an ontological necessity, although it seems to be strongly suggested as the rational consequence of the restoration of the powers of the soul.
Maximus names the will as at least one of the powers of the soul that will be restored. Does that mean that gnomic will (the deliberative will particular to the fallen nature) will be transformed into natural will?
If so, and that seems most likely to be the case, this is the boldest statement in support of the apokatastasis that we can find in the writings of Maximos. How can it be possible not to repent and to beg for the forgiveness of God in the most profound and sincere way, once our will has been restored to the natural will which is subject to God's will?
St Maximus does not speculate beyond the moment when the human being has knowledge (epignosis) of God. This does not necessarily mean the participation in Him, simply knowledge of Him. That knowledge will, nevertheless, be 'entire' and 'complete' and 'perfect' according to the soul's attainment of virtue in this life.
Thus some will be close to God, and some will be distant; some a hundredfold, some sixtyfold, some thirtyfold, and again, in the 'many mansions', some will be close to the Temple that stands at the centre of the Celestial City, some will be at further remove ... but all will be at the place they should be, according to their attainment in this life, and all will be at the fullness of their being.
The question is, how can we understand the restoration of the natural will in the soul, with everything this entails about the passions and the tendency to sin?
Will it be possible for human, angelic and even demonic souls, at the moment of their bodily and psychic restoration, to repent, to be forgiven and be accepted in the kingdom of God (since they cast off their deliberative, gnomic will, and should be able to see the difference between good and evil), or will the return be restricted to the ones who repented during life on earth?
This is the big question.
If no repentence is possible, then what 'good' in in punishment? None. Then what is the point?
Either repentance is possible, and the 'pain' and 'torment' is in realising the truth, and how far shoert we have fallen of our potentiality ... so this is not a punishment inflicted by God, so much as a remorse at the realisation of a degree of error and self-will ... and contrition.
If repentence is not possible, then the judgement is final. Again, God does not inflict pain or torment, but rather the human soul has, by its own determination, consigned itself to non-reality; it has no place in the scheme of things, and the best biblical signifier of this state is gehenna — the place where those who have no place are disposed of ... the idea of flame, fire, torment, etc., is just the language of the volative will ... the reality is more frightening — the utter extinction of the soul.
This idea is unthinkable ... but the idea of a God who is the plaything of man, of man who can do what he likes in life because God will forgive him regardless, is equally irrational ...
So as long as man is free to accept God, he is free to deny Him, and if he is free to deny Him, there must be a logical consequence of that act.
Thomas