INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHODOne needs a template, a starting point for our science of the web (SOTW). As a first approximation, one can begin with what is known as the scientific method, what scientists and philosophers of science believe to be a description of how science is done. I am assuming we need some memory jogging on the subject of scientific method, so I will start with a short history. Then I will go on to list some of the historical descriptions before summing up and presenting a tentative heuristic of the scientific method.
HISTORY: Most of these individuals would identify the real pioneers of the scientific method to be the Arab Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen) and the Persian Ibn Sina (Avicenna) whose method was based on observation, experiment, mathematics, and publishing. Their work, published in the 1000s promulgated throughout the Arab world and influenced the work of the late scholastics Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, who in turn influenced Sir Francis Bacon who first considered induction as a key in the scientific method. In turn he influenced Rene Descartes and Sir Isaac Newton whose conceptions set the standard for the next two hundred years. In the nineteenth century Whewell and Mills formalized the scientific method as the hypothetical-deductive method. In the early 20th century Charles Sanders Peirce developed the pragmatic theory based on induction in repose to the European instrumentalist (later logical positivist) method. The Hempel and Popper models (the deductive-nomologic and falsifiability) were in many ways a refutation of Peirce. Things got a lot more confusing and complex with the publication of work by Hansen, Polanyi, Kuhn, Lakatos, Lauden, and Feyerabend beginning in the second half of the century. Recently with the work of catastrophe, chaos, complexity, and information theoretics has led to a renaissance of inductive and abductive thought and “inference to the best explanation” (see the work of Hanson, Lipton, and Psillos), as well as possibilitic or probabilistic approaches.
ALHAZEN: Alhazen’s method resembled modern scientific method and consisted of the following procedures:
- Testing and/or criticism of a hypothesis using experimentation
- Interpretation of data and formulation of a conclusion using mathematics
- The publication of the findings
BACON: Sir Francis Bacon added several dimensions:
- Facts cannot be collected from nature, but must be constituted by methodical procedures, which have to be put into practice by scientists in order to ascertain the empirical basis for inductive generalizations.
- His induction, founded on collection, comparison, and exclusion of factual qualities in things and their interior structure, proved to be a revolutionary achievement within natural philosophy, for which no example in classical antiquity existed.
- Bacon's method relied on experimental histories to eliminate alternative theories via post experimental deduction.
NEWTON: Both Bacon and Descartes wanted to provide a firm foundation for scientific thought that avoided the deceptions of the mind and senses. Bacon envisaged that foundation as essentially empirical, whereas Descartes provides a metaphysical foundation for knowledge. If there were any doubts about the direction in which scientific method would develop, they were set to rest by the success of Isaac Newton. Implicitly rejecting Descartes' emphasis on rationalism in favor of Bacon's empirical approach, he outlines his four "rules of reasoning":
- We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
- Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.
- The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intension nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
- In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.
But Newton also left an admonition about a theory of everything: "To explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one man or even for any one age. 'Tis much better to do a little with certainty, and leave the rest for others that come after you, than to explain all things."
PEIRCE: The last big contribution came from Peirce who considered scientific method to be the method wherein inquiry regards itself as fallible and purposely tests itself and criticizes, corrects, and improves itself. Peirce held that slow, stumbling ratiocination can be dangerously inferior to instinct and traditional sentiment in practical matters, and that the scientific method is best suited to theoretical research,which in turn should not be trammeled by the other methods and practical ends; reason's "first rule" is that, in order to learn, one must desire to learn and, as a corollary, must not block the way of inquiry. This is captured in his “maxim of pragmatism”: “The study of philosophy consists, therefore, in reflexion, and pragmatism is that method of reflexion which is guided by constantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes, whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought. It will be seen that pragmatism is not a [world view] but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear”. Two things must be noted here, first “reflexion” is Piece’s term referring to an introspective process of deep analytical thought. Secondly, Peirce identifies reflexion not with deductive, or foundationalistic (self-justifying), or coherentistic (justified heirachtically) thought, but with an advance to inductive thought he called abduction (see references to abduction, “inference to the best explanation” and the Nyaya school of Indian logic). Abductive reasoning has the following type of form:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
Peirce's approach to the scientific method is that it is a three-phase dynamic of inquiry:
- Active, abductive genesis of theory, with no prior assurance of truth;
- Deductive application of the contingent theory so as to clarify its practical implications;
- Inductive testing and evaluation of the provisional theory's utility for the anticipation of future experience, in both senses: prediction and control.
CONTEMPORARY: As described earlier after Peirce the twentieth century saw an explosion of papers and theories about the scientific method, culminating in the Kuhn-Lakotos-Lauden-Polanyi-Feyerabend debates of the 60s and 70s. With the rise of catastrophe (see Rene Thom), chaos (see Edward Lorentz), and complexity (see Santa Fe Institute) theoretics, artificial intelligence, emergence science (see Ilya Prigogine, Stuart Kauffman and Gregory Bateson), as well as advances in possibilitic or probabilistic approaches (see Richard Jeffries, LJ Savage, Edwin Jaynes, Guilio D’Agostini) has led to a resurgence in inductive-abductive approach to scientific method (see N.R. Hansen, P Thagard, Ilkka Niiniluoto, G.J.M. Kruijff in addition to Hanson, Lipton, and Psillos).
The remaining thing to be done now is to create a tentative heuristic of the scientific method. Which will form the next post “PRINCIPLES”.
Pax et amore omnia vincunt, Radarmark
