Samuel Stuart Maynes
New Member
- Messages
- 3
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 0
Kant’s moral argument may be stated quite simply: God is not directly apparent in the phenomenal material world, but may exist in a noumenal spiritual realm. Since humans can ‘know’ nothing directly about the noumenal realm, the existence of God cannot be ‘proven’ beyond a doubt. However, to account for moral feelings of conscience, the existence of objective moral values, and the rationality of pursuing the highest good (universal virtue as a means to greatest happiness) we must assume the existence of God.
Without prejudice, we must assume that the rational disbeliever, as well as the doubting believer, will act as if some sort of divinity exists, recognizing (if only obscurely or unconsciously) that the moral law (the universal categorical imperative of pure reason) is the absolute upon which the whole of law and justice are grounded, and that without God, nothing is Absolute, but all is relative.
You don’t have to believe in God in order to be moral, but it helps. After all, it is only from the rational unity of One God (creating all humankind equal), that we know unequivocally that morality must take a universal view. Unfortunately, atheism is sometimes an invitation to, as well as a licence for, ethical relativism; and a self-centred materialistic morality, which is only universal when convenient, or a matter of personal taste (character virtues, values, and goodwill).
Part of the argument is that if there is no ultimately objective standard of morality (no God), then our constructs of moral reason have no basis, other than our feelings about their goodness. Then, moral maxims must be a matter of taste and muddled reason; and then there is no sound foundation for world-wide law and justice. But if there is no absolutely universal basis for moral fairness (that most people can at least dimly sense and recognize), then mediocre maxims become acceptable (e.g. When in Rome do as the Romans do... Look out for number one, and devil take the hindmost... etc.). Then ultimately, even anti-social maxims bespeaking elitist attitudes are no longer not questioned, but are respected, and even celebrated by some (e.g., David Hume’s famous moral question: “Why should I not prefer the destruction of worlds, to the scratching of my little finger?” – What’s it to me?).
Thus, we conclude that we must assume that there is One God upholding the absolute universal law of justice, mercy, and ethical behaviour; which is expressed in the personal Golden Rule (taught by Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, and many others), as well as in the universal moral law of the One Categorical Imperative enunciated by Kant. This is the common denominator of the highest expression of objective morality, and we take it from Hegel that the highest idea is the absolute of its kind, and the Absolute of all kinds is God.
Samuel Stuart Maynes
Without prejudice, we must assume that the rational disbeliever, as well as the doubting believer, will act as if some sort of divinity exists, recognizing (if only obscurely or unconsciously) that the moral law (the universal categorical imperative of pure reason) is the absolute upon which the whole of law and justice are grounded, and that without God, nothing is Absolute, but all is relative.
You don’t have to believe in God in order to be moral, but it helps. After all, it is only from the rational unity of One God (creating all humankind equal), that we know unequivocally that morality must take a universal view. Unfortunately, atheism is sometimes an invitation to, as well as a licence for, ethical relativism; and a self-centred materialistic morality, which is only universal when convenient, or a matter of personal taste (character virtues, values, and goodwill).
Part of the argument is that if there is no ultimately objective standard of morality (no God), then our constructs of moral reason have no basis, other than our feelings about their goodness. Then, moral maxims must be a matter of taste and muddled reason; and then there is no sound foundation for world-wide law and justice. But if there is no absolutely universal basis for moral fairness (that most people can at least dimly sense and recognize), then mediocre maxims become acceptable (e.g. When in Rome do as the Romans do... Look out for number one, and devil take the hindmost... etc.). Then ultimately, even anti-social maxims bespeaking elitist attitudes are no longer not questioned, but are respected, and even celebrated by some (e.g., David Hume’s famous moral question: “Why should I not prefer the destruction of worlds, to the scratching of my little finger?” – What’s it to me?).
Thus, we conclude that we must assume that there is One God upholding the absolute universal law of justice, mercy, and ethical behaviour; which is expressed in the personal Golden Rule (taught by Buddha, Jesus, Muhammad, and many others), as well as in the universal moral law of the One Categorical Imperative enunciated by Kant. This is the common denominator of the highest expression of objective morality, and we take it from Hegel that the highest idea is the absolute of its kind, and the Absolute of all kinds is God.
Samuel Stuart Maynes