What is faith? This entry focuses on
the nature of faith, although issues about
the justifiability of faith are also implicated.
The concept of faith is a broad one: at its most general ‘faith’ means much the same as ‘trust’. This entry is specifically concerned, however, with the notion of
religious faith—or, rather (and the difference is important),
the kind of faith exemplified in religious faith. Philosophical accounts are almost exclusively about
theistic religious faith—faith in God—and they generally, though not exclusively, deal with faith as understood within the Christian branch of the Abrahamic traditions.
But, although the theistic religious context settles what kind of faith is of interest, the question arises whether faith of that same general kind also belongs to other, non-theistic, religious contexts, or to contexts not usually thought of as religious at all. It may perhaps be apt to speak of the faith of—for example—a humanist, or even an atheist, using the same general sense of ‘faith’ as applies to the theist case.
Philosophical reflection on theistic religious faith has produced different accounts or models of its nature. This entry suggests that there are three key components that may feature, with varying emphases, in models of faith—namely the
affective, the
cognitive and the
volitional. Several different principles according to which models of faith may be categorized are noted, including
- how the model relates faith as a state to faith as an act or activity;
- whether it takes its object to be exclusively propositional or not;
- the type of epistemology with which the model is associated—‘evidentialist’ or ‘fideist’;
- whether the model is necessarily restricted to theistic religious faith, or may extend beyond it.