Barely refrains from posting preachers, popes, and televangelists waving in gifsI'm sorry. Sounds like hand-waving to me ...
Settles on, its turtles all the way down.
Just because we don't know an answer doesn't ran the answer is God
Barely refrains from posting preachers, popes, and televangelists waving in gifsI'm sorry. Sounds like hand-waving to me ...
That's insulting. Typical, when presented with a difficult argument, attack the person making it.Barely refrains from posting preachers, popes, and televangelists waving in gifs
Settles on, its turtles all the way down.
Just because we don't know an answer doesn't ran the answer is God
Yes. No, I've said it clearly several times.It is ONLY when you use the Jamal argument to attempt to prove God, that I disagree.
Are you denying that was the case all along?
So you are saying God is self evident?To disprove God, first you must disprove the Kalam argument by showing one of its propositions is false.
The opposite. God is spirit. Spirit is 'outside' nature. Outside is the wrong word. Spirit contains and surrounds and permeates nature. Spirit is not dependent on nature. It's the other way around: spirit 'weaves' nature.So you are saying God is self evident?
Most modern 'star' science personalities, who parade on You Tube and write books like 'The God Delusion'.Otherwise why would anyone have to disprove God?
As an aside, I think this is the New Atheist position, the bad science position, and equally the bad theology position, because its claims are aimed at a populist audience, and the acceptance of such claims are proportionate to the degree of hyperbole. (It's why Plato disliked and discredited rhetoric as a discipline.)... when presented with a difficult argument, attack the person making it.
Not offended, but I feel with you wrt hand-waving, only about the "but what was before time" part.I'm sorry. Sounds like hand-waving to me ...
EDIT: Please, no personal offence
What was before time, then?Not offended, but I feel with you wrt hand-waving, only about the "but what was before time" part.
... Isn’t there a theory that the singularity was produced by membranes rubbing together ?
What do the volumes say?Says volumes to me ...
Powessy,
Congrats on the length of the last two messages!
ASIDE:
The God Delusion. Richard Dawkin's Argument for atheism.
496 pages, Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 2,534 in Books
10th Anniversary Edition
God Is Not A Delusion. Thomas Crean (short and succinct) dismantling of Dawkin's argument.
159 pages. Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 730,052 in Books
Out of print
Says volumes to me ...
That's a very general question. Can you narrow it down, as I think I'd enjoy discussing this?
"Chalmers is best known for formulating what he calls the hard problem of consciousness, in both his 1995 paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and his 1996 book The Conscious Mind. He makes a distinction between "easy" problems of consciousness, such as explaining object discrimination or verbal reports, and the single hard problem, which could be stated "why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?" The essential difference between the (cognitive) easy problems and the (phenomenal) hard problem is that the former are at least theoretically answerable via the dominant strategy in the philosophy of mind: physicalism. Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states are caused by physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems. This view could also be characterized by more traditional formulations such as property dualism.
In support of this, Chalmers is famous for his commitment to the logical (though, importantly, not natural) possibility of philosophical zombies.[13] These zombies, unlike the zombie of popular fiction, are complete physical duplicates of human beings, lacking only qualitative experience. Chalmers argues that since such zombies are conceivable to us, they must therefore be logically possible. Since they are logically possible, then qualia and sentience are not fully explained by physical properties alone; the facts about them are further facts. Instead, Chalmers argues that consciousness is a fundamental property ontologically autonomous of any known (or even possible) physical properties,[14] and that there may be lawlike rules which he terms "psychophysical laws" that determine which physical systems are associated with which types of qualia. He further speculates that all information-bearing systems may be conscious, leading him to entertain the possibility of conscious thermostats and a qualified panpsychism he calls panprotopsychism. Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding that the viability of panpsychism places him at odds with the majority of his contemporaries. According to Chalmers, his arguments are similar to a line of thought that goes back to Leibniz's 1714 "mill" argument; the first substantial use of philosophical "zombie" terminology may be Robert Kirk's 1974 "Zombies vs. Materialists""
Sorry:There was no was or before - these words indicate time