History of Philosophy | 18 Middle and Neo-Platonism

[Ahanu]

D'you think so? I don't.


Just to clarify – credal statements in Tertullian are word-for-word the same as in Nicaea and Constantinople.

Your own source (the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), which you used earlier, argues against the conclusions you gather from word-for-word similarities.

The SEP is clear: "...such usage [of terms like 'Trinity'] doesn’t reflect trinitarian belief." It argues the vocabulary existed, but not the Trinitarian belief behind it.

The SEP states Tertullian did not believe in a tripersonal God, but rather a "tripersonal portion of matter."

The SEP details how the meaning of terms and phrases used by Tertullian is very different from the Nicene and Constantinopolitan understanding of the Trinity. Superficial word similarities in some credal statements mask substantive theological differences, so they are irrelevant.

The SEP declares: "They [late second and third century authors] profess a 'trinity', triad or threesome, but not a triune or tripersonal God." This is more than just lacking a "technical definition." There is a different conception of the divine.

So the Church was Trinitarian in everything but later philosophical technical definition from the get-go.

The SEP's argument is precisely that the early Church was not Trinitarian in belief, even if they used some language or practices that later became associated with Trinitarianism (like the baptismal formula). It isn't just about "technical definitions." It's about fundamental doctrinal differences.

Referring to the 2nd and 3rd century, the SEP says: "Nor did they consider these to be equally divine." Equality of divinity is essential to Trinitarianism. Its absence in early thought is a major deviation.

Regarding Tertullian, it states: "The Son, on this theory, is not God himself, nor is he divine in the same sense that the Father is." Therefore, it is not just a matter of technical language.

There was not a situation where Trinitarianism was already present "from the get-go," lacking only "technical definition."

Overall, the SEP emphasizes the challenges and struggles early Christians faced in reconciling monotheism with the divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit. These struggles are portrayed as theological hurdles, not just terminological issues. If Trinitarian belief was already present "in everything but definition," these struggles would not be necessary.

 

[Ahanu]

Just to clarify – credal statements in Tertullian are word-for-word the same as in Nicaea and Constantinople.

I am not ignoring differences, I'm pointing out the path of development. Nicaea laid the foundation for later doctrinal development, but it was nowhere near a Trinitarian Council and supplied only the barest Trinitarian definition.

You say you aren't ignoring differences, but your arguments demonstrate otherwise. You assert "word-for-word sameness" and "Trinitarian in everything but definition," while simultaneously acknowledging "differences" and a "path of development." This contradiction ultimately functions to obscure the real and significant differences that we find in the SEP.

 

[Thomas]

The SEP is clear...

I am suggesting:
1: Christianity, from the outset, can be said to declare that a belief in 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit', and a baptism in the name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit are conditional upon entering the community. In that sense, there is a body of people who acknowledge One God, and yet in effect swear allegiance to 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit', yet do not see themselves as transgressing the First Commandment.

2: That Confession of Faith in the three: Father, Son and Holy Spirit, I refer to as 'Trinitarian' from the outset, even though the term itself was not coined until the 2nd century, and the doctrinal definitions emerge much later – the idea of 'person', for example, emerged from Christological (not Trinitarian) questions of the 4th and 5th centuries – these later definitions often corrected erroneous ideas.

3: Therefore I propose that the Faith of the first centuries was Trinitarian in spirit – Father, Son and Holy Spirit – whereas the Faith according to the letter emerged over time.

4: I argue this on the basis that the object of Faith – Father, Son and Holy Spirit – remained the same, whereas the understanding of the nature of Father, Son and Holy Spirit changed significantly and in some senses radically – the Christian of the 1st century and the 5th make the same basic credal statements, and receive the same baptism, and harbour the same hope of salvation.

5: The later arguments regarding Father Son and Holy Spirit were not whether they were God, but rather how they were God, and how, in the light of that, each relates to the other.

6: This process, contemporaneous with a defence of that Faith from criticism from without (eg Justin against Trypho, Origen against Celsus), involved the Fathers utilising philosophical theory, language and lexicon which inevitable had the effect of shaping the argument – the Fathers being obliged to argue their case in alien terms, on alien ground, as it were. One might say pagan theologies of the Platonist and the Stoics had a head start over the Christian theologians. This process is not without risk, evident when the likes of Justin align too closely with alien ideas ('a second god') to make their case.

7: In time, the theory, language and lexicon was shaped according to a growing understanding and insight into the Faith and its promise, and so whilst the influence of Middle and later NeoPlatonism is evident, and will remain so because the pagan thinker is not necessarily wrong because they are not Christian, the final declarations with regard to Trinitarian doctrine had moved away from a dependence on Greek philosophy within its own hermeneutic into one uniquely Christian, and it is this which gives Trinitarianism its unique expression.

+++

The SEP states:
"No theologian in the first three Christian centuries was a trinitarian in the sense of a believing that the one God is tripersonal, containing equally divine “persons”, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."

To which the response is 'of course not', because the discussion of 'person' and the distinction between 'nature' (Gk physis Lt natura) and 'person' (Gk prosopon Lt persona) did not occur until the 4th-5th centuries, actually driven by Christological debate.

It argues the vocabulary existed, but not the Trinitarian belief behind it.

I'd argue the other way round.

The term itself appears in the 2nd century, and applies to something already understood – it's clearly not introducing a new concept but naming an existing one – then the term is applicable to the belief of Christians of a triune Godhead, even if in its early iterations it is somewhat at odds with later definitions, and the later statements employed a vocabulary which had itself evolved.

BTW: There's strong evidence that homoousios was a term adopted not from Plato, but from the Gnostic schools of Basilides and Valentinus, who drew them from the Hermetic literature of the day. Origen employed the term, but in no great detail. The term was deployed at Nicaea, then does not appear in debate for another thirty years ...

The SEP states Tertullian did not believe in a tripersonal God, but rather a "tripersonal portion of matter."

Quite. The SEP also states that Tertullian "strongly emphasizes that these are truly three; none of the three is identical to any other." Yet, at the same time, "They are “undivided” in the sense that the Father, in sharing some of his matter, never loses any; rather, that matter comes to simultaneously compose more than one being."
The idea of the Father 'sharing' without ever actually losing or 'giving away' points to a qualitative understanding of matter, rather than a quantitative. It goes on –
"The Father is one entity, the Son is a second, and the Spirit is a third. Nor are they parts of any whole... "

"Despite these fundamental differences from later orthodoxy, Tertullian is now hailed by trinitarians for his use of the term “Trinity” (Latin: trinitas) and his view that it (at the last stage) consists of three persons with a common or shared “substance”."

So very much in essence the same Trinity as spoken in the 4th, 5th and following centuries, although different in substance as the technical lexicon underwent significant revision and redefinition.

He also argues that the three are not identical ...

Nor are they, but yet undivided.

It's about fundamental doctrinal differences.

The fundamental doctrine is a belief in Father, Son and Holy Spirit – the Father wills, the Son redeems, the Holy Spirit sanctifies ... there's a Trinitarian belief from the Apostolic Era.

If Trinitarian belief was already present "in everything but definition," these struggles would not be necessary.

The struggles were, and are, all about the definition of relation.

 

[Thomas]

This contradiction ultimately functions to obscure the real and significant differences that we find in the SEP.

It transcends and thereby resolves the apparent contradictions.

I'm trying to make your understanding easier. You continually try and make it harder.

 

[Ahanu]

It transcends and thereby resolves the apparent contradictions.

I'm trying to make your understanding easier. You continually try and make it harder.

Your insistence on an unchanging "essence" of Trinitarian belief "from the Apostolic Era" simply isn't supported by the historical evidence presented in the SEP.

To which the response is 'of course not', because the discussion of 'person' and the distinction between 'nature' (Gk physis Lt natura) and 'person' (Gk prosopon Lt persona) did not occur until the 4th-5th centuries, actually driven by Christological debate.

It reflects a different theological framework and a less defined understanding of the Godhead. The SEP emphasizes that the development of these concepts was not just a matter of adding technical terms, but it represented a significant shift in how Christians understood the inner being of God.

I'd argue the other way round.

The term itself appears in the 2nd century, and applies to something already understood – it's clearly not introducing a new concept but naming an existing one – then the term is applicable to the belief of Christians of a triune Godhead, even if in its early iterations it is somewhat at odds with later definitions, and the later statements employed a vocabulary which had itself evolved.

Well, the SEP argues that early use of "Trinity" terminology "doesn't reflect trinitarian belief." You suggest the term was "naming an existing one," implying a pre-existing Trinitarian concept that simply needed a label. However, the SEP shows us that the concept itself was still in formation and was not the same as the later, orthodox Trinitarian concept. The "something already understood" was, according to the SEP, a "triad" or "threesome," - a different theological construct than the "tripersonal God." The SEP's point is that "Trinity" in the 2nd and 3rd centuries was not just an "early iteration" of the same doctrine, but something qualitatively different.

Quite. The SEP also states that Tertullian "strongly emphasizes that these are truly three; none of the three is identical to any other." Yet, at the same time, "They are “undivided” in the sense that the Father, in sharing some of his matter, never loses any; rather, that matter comes to simultaneously compose more than one being."
The idea of the Father 'sharing' without ever actually losing or 'giving away' points to a qualitative understanding of matter, rather than a quantitative. It goes on –
"The Father is one entity, the Son is a second, and the Spirit is a third. Nor are they parts of any whole... "

"Despite these fundamental differences from later orthodoxy, Tertullian is now hailed by trinitarians for his use of the term “Trinity” (Latin: trinitas) and his view that it (at the last stage) consists of three persons with a common or shared “substance”."

So very much in essence the same Trinity as spoken in the 4th, 5th and following centuries, although different in substance as the technical lexicon underwent significant revision and redefinition.

The SEP does not say that Tertullian's view is "very much in essence the same Trinity" as later orthodoxy, but it does say his Trinity has "fundamental differences from later orthodoxy." To sum it up in one brief recap, the shift was from a materialistic, subordinationist triad to an immaterial, co-equal, and unified Triune God. Tertullian has three entities related by shared "stuff." The 4th, 5th, and following centuries confess one God in three Persons.

Nor are they, but yet undivided.

Tertullian's "undividedness" is about the amount of matter being shared, not an ontological unity of being. Later Trinitarian theology uses "undivided" to describe the ontological indivisibility of the divine essence itself, a completely different concept.

Tertullian is important for contributing to the vocabulary of Trinitarianism, but his underlying theological framework is significantly distinct, not "very much in essence the same Trinity." To equate his Trinity with the Nicene/post-Nicene Trinity "in essence" is misleading and not supported by a thorough reading of sources like the SEP.

The fundamental doctrine is a belief in Father, Son and Holy Spirit – the Father wills, the Son redeems, the Holy Spirit sanctifies ... there's a Trinitarian belief from the Apostolic Era.

"A belief in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" is so broad as to be almost meaningless in this context. When you write "the Father wills, the Son redeems, the Holy Spirit sanctifies," you're simply describing God's actions in relation to creation. It's not about what Father, Son, and Spirit are in their inner being. It is about what they do in salvation history. Uh, many theological perspectives outside of orthodox Trinitarianism can affirm these functional roles.

To illustrate this point further, consider how the Baha'i understanding can easily interpret "Father wills, Son redeems, Holy Spirit sanctifies" as descriptions of the functions performed by different "mirrors." The Father wills could be seen as the primordial will of the Divine Essence, the ultimate source of all. The Son redeems could be seen as revealing God's love and guidance, leading humanity back to spiritual health. His sacrifice and teachings can be understood as redemptive in a Baha'i context. The Holy Spirit sanctifies could be seen as the "outpouring grace of God" manifested in Christ, the sanctifying power that transforms individuals and society, guided by the teachings and example of the Manifestation.

 

[Thomas]

Your insistence on an unchanging "essence" of Trinitarian belief "from the Apostolic Era" simply isn't supported by the historical evidence presented in the SEP.

I said Trinitarian belief, not Trinitarian doctrine. The doctrines emerge as a defence of the belief.

It reflects a different theological framework and a less defined understanding of the Godhead.

Yes. Theology is 'faith seeking understanding' as Anselm famously said, and that still applies.

Christians believe in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, then, as now. I doubt your average 21st century Christian could explain the Doctrine of the Trinity, nor even offer definitions of such terms as 'homoousios' or 'hypostasis' ... doesn't matter.

We worship in the spirit. (In fact, in the Spirit.) You're arguing over the letter. I'm happy to do that, as long as we acknowledge the spirit is superior. The letter is just clever people offering viable explanations.

However, the SEP shows us that the concept itself was still in formation and was not the same as the later, orthodox Trinitarian concept.

And no concept will ever adequately express the exact and precise nature of the Trinity.

"A belief in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" is so broad as to be almost meaningless in this context.

Then maybe the context is at fault, it certaionly is if the context has lost sight of the 'bigger picture'. It's a finger and the moon thing, which I've said often.

When you write "the Father wills, the Son redeems, the Holy Spirit sanctifies," you're simply describing God's actions in relation to creation. It's not about what Father, Son, and Spirit are in their inner being. It is about what they do in salvation history. Uh, many theological perspectives outside of orthodox Trinitarianism can affirm these functional roles.

We call it the 'Economic Trinity' (from the Gk οἰκονομία, oikonomia, – 'handling', 'disposition' or 'management', commonly with regard to 'housekeeping'). The 'inner being' discussion we call the Immanent Trinity.

In the Fathers, the distinction was between oikonomia and theologia. Athanasius spoke of the incarnation of the Logos as “that which is kata oikonomia,” meaning in regard to the work of God in and to the world, and he spoke of the eternal deity of the Son as “that which is kata theologia,” referring to His divinity.

 

[Ahanu]

I said Trinitarian belief, not Trinitarian doctrine. The doctrines emerge as a defence of the belief.

I think the issue isn't simply about semantics or labeling something as belief versus doctrine. The core problem is whether this supposed Trinitarian belief of the Apostolic Era (even if we call it a pre-doctrinal intuition or whatever you would prefer to call it) was essentially the same in its understanding of God as the later orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. And whether historical evidence (or, as you would say, "the letter") supports the idea of this unchanging essence existing from the beginning.

The understanding of the Godhead in the early Church was far more diverse than a simple "belief in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" that neatly aligns with later Trinitarianism without the packaged labels. The debate is about those doctrines shaping and defining what that belief even meant. The historical record points to a process of genuine doctrinal development, not just the articulation of a static, unchanging core idea.

For example, the SEP shows the prevalence of subordinationist views in early Christianity. Were these subordinationist understandings simply a variation within the same Trinitarian belief, or did they represent a fundamentally different way of conceiving the relationship between Father and Son? Similarly, the eventual insistence on homoousios was a huge theological innovation, not just a refinement of a pre-existing idea.

Again, I acknowledge Christians from the beginning invoked Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But it is inaccurate to characterize their understanding as possessing an unchanging Trinitarian belief or essence from the Apostolic Era just because, say, "John could well mean Jesus is ontologically one with God," but "he simply hasn't had reason to get into a dialogue about the technicalities of that claim."

Yes. Theology is 'faith seeking understanding' as Anselm famously said, and that still applies.

Christians believe in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, then, as now. I doubt your average 21st century Christian could explain the Doctrine of the Trinity, nor even offer definitions of such terms as 'homoousios' or 'hypostasis' ... doesn't matter.

We worship in the spirit. (In fact, in the Spirit.) You're arguing over the letter. I'm happy to do that, as long as we acknowledge the spirit is superior. The letter is just clever people offering viable explanations.

Still, the understanding that emerged over time regarding the Trinity was very different from the initial theological frameworks that were less defined. By the way, when I say early Christian theology was less defined, I'm not just talking about a mere lack of sophisticated vocabulary - I'm talking about fundamental differences in how the relationship between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit was conceived.

The letter is the historical record of how Christian understanding of God developed. And that historical record reveals a big evolution, not just a consistent belief clothed in different language.

I can see why you would like to dismiss or downplay the letter - or the doctrinal and historical details. That historical reality challenges the idea of an unchanging Trinitarian belief from the Apostolic Era. To truly understand the spirit of early Christian faith, we need to engage seriously with the letter of their theological expressions. Ignoring or downplaying the letter risks projecting later Trinitarian understandings back onto a period where they simply did not exist in the same way.

Then maybe the context is at fault, it certaionly is if the context has lost sight of the 'bigger picture'. It's a finger and the moon thing, which I've said often.

I don't believe the context is at fault here, nor that we're simply missing the bigger picture like mistaking the finger for the moon. The finger and the moon analogy might be helpful for explaining complex development of Trinitarian doctrine to laypeople. The moon is the Immanent Trinity, and it was not always understood in the same way. The finger is the functional descriptions that only partially points towards it. The journey from the finger to a clear and defined understanding of the moon was a long and complicated process. It was not a simple matter of always believing the same thing but expressing it in different ways.

We call it the 'Economic Trinity' (from the Gk οἰκονομία, oikonomia, – 'handling', 'disposition' or 'management', commonly with regard to 'housekeeping'). The 'inner being' discussion we call the Immanent Trinity.

In the Fathers, the distinction was between oikonomia and theologia. Athanasius spoke of the incarnation of the Logos as “that which is kata oikonomia,” meaning in regard to the work of God in and to the world, and he spoke of the eternal deity of the Son as “that which is kata theologia,” referring to His divinity.

The very distinction between the Economic and Immanent Trinity actually highlights the point I have been making. You rightly point out without a doubt that descriptions like "Father wills, Son redeems, Holy Spirit sanctifies" relate to the "Economic Trinity" - God's actions ad extra, outwards towards creation. My point is that these functional descriptions alone are insufficient to establish the orthodox doctrine of the Immanent Trinity - the Trinity in its inner, eternal being. The Baha'i view, and many other theological perspectives, can readily accommodate functional roles attributed to divine figures without necessarily implying the complex metaphysical structure of the Immanent Trinity - three co-equal persons sharing one divine essence. These functional descriptions are, as I said, so broad as to be almost meaningless when trying to prove the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. They are not uniquely Trinitarian markers.

And no concept will ever adequately express the exact and precise nature of the Trinity.

There's still a historical reality - the letter - of how Christian concepts of the Trinity evolved. Let's not downplay it.

That's an anachronistic argument, isn't it, applying later definitions?

Likewise he cannot argue is that John is saying separate substances, for the same reason – that discussion hasn't happened yet – so here John could well mean Jesus is ontologically one with God, he simply hasn't had reason to get into a dialogue about the technicalities of that claim.

The first-century discussion wasn't about substance at all. John's Gospel, especially when read in light of John 17, points to a relational and functional unity understood within the prevailing first-century Jewish framework of agency and representation. This unity is not about a metaphysical identity of substance in the later philosophical sense. It is one defined by the context of divine agency rather than abstract ontology.

The Jews listening certainly thought that is what He was claiming to be a god, and went to stone Him for blasphemy (v33) – but McClellan's argument lacks substance.

Well, the Jewish reaction can actually be seen as evidence for the prevalence of the theme of misunderstanding in John's Gospel. It is replete with instances where Jesus speaks on a symbolic level, and his Jewish audience consistently misunderstands him, taking his words literally, often leading to confusion and threats of violence.

For example, consider the telling example of spiritual freedom in John 8.31-36. Jesus offers liberation from the yoke of sin, a spiritual promise. Yet the Jews become fixated on their earthly lineage from Abraham. They misconstrue his words as being about physical enslavement, protesting, "We are offspring of Abraham and have never been enslaved to anyone." Let us pause here and pose a direct question: Are we, as readers of John, truly meant to believe that these very Jews, in this very moment, were literally, physically enslaved simply because they declared they had never been enslaved and understood Jesus to be contradicting this false claim?

When we reach John 10.33 and witness their accusation of blasphemy, we must view it through this lens of pervasive misunderstanding. This accusation is not necessarily an accurate reflection of Jesus's self-claim as understood by Jesus himself or the Gospel writer. Instead, it is their misinterpretation based on their pre-conceived notions and their tendency to take Jesus's words in a way he did not intend.

McClellan rightly argues, in my opinion, that Jesus was making a profound claim about his divine status and authority, a claim rooted in his unique relationship with God and his role as God's authorized agent, but not necessarily the claim to ontological identity with the Father that his audience erroneously perceived and violently rejected.

Context, context, context.

And he then makes certain claims about the nature of 'Mutual Indwelling' which I find theologically shallow and dependent upon false dilemma.

Within the Hebrew Bible and Greco-Roman Jewish thought, mutual indwelling is not as shallow and simplistic an idea as you make it out to be. It is the very mechanism through which divine presence, power, authority, and even glory are mediated and shared. This idea is linked to the Divine Name, divine agency, and the ancient understanding of divine images. It's a theology rooted in different categories than later Greek philosophy, but it is a rich theology in its own right. Perhaps the depth you perceive in later Trinitarian formulations is, in part, a product of centuries of philosophical development.

 

[Ahanu]

so here John could well mean Jesus is ontologically one with God, he simply hasn't had reason to get into a dialogue about the technicalities of that claim.

Not in light of John 17, which reveals the nature of the unity Jesus has with the Father, and that this very same kind of unity is also extended to Jesus' followers. This immediately signals that the oneness being described is not a unique, ontological oneness of substance. It's a relational and functional unity that can be shared.

Jesus prays that his disciples "may be one, as we are one" (John 17.11). If the unity between Father and Son in John 10.30 were about ontological consubstantiality, it would be highly problematic to then pray for disciples to have that same ontological unity.

McClellan argues that John 17 provides the interpretive key for understanding what oneness primarily means in John's Gospel, especially when read in light of passages like John 10.30.