History of Philosophy | 18 Middle and Neo-Platonism

[Thomas]

That is in the Spirit and not the Flesh.

Well, I'd not go so far as to assume God does not love what He causes to be.

 

[Ahanu]

But nevertheless, you are about to suggest we do the latter ...

Only if you consider the tradition valid. The tradition might need to be re-examined . . .

The Greek adverb καθὼς kathōs in context is translated as 'as, just as, even as, like'

Your point about the translation of καθὼς sure doesn't weaken the argument. The presence of this adverb highlights that Jesus is drawing a parallel between the unity of the Father and Son and the unity he desires for his followers. The dilemma still stands: what kind of unity is being compared? If the oneness in John 10.30 is ontological consubstantiality, then the as in John 17 logically implies that believers would also share in that same ontological being. You haven't explained how this doesn't lead to the illogical absurdity of countless individuals becoming part of the divine essence and expanding the Trinity.

Well I see Point 1 as an ontological consubstantiality in glory.

You're asserting an ontological consubstantiality in glory, but you're still not addressing the logical implication for John 17. Even if we say that believers share in divine glory, the question is how this allows them to be one as we are one (John 17.11, 22) without them becoming ontologically identical to the Father and the Son in the same way the Father and Son are to each other. You're describing a sharing, but consubstantiality implies a shared substance or being. How does glory function as this shared substance for believers in a way that doesn't redefine the Trinity?

Chapter 17:
"Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify thee... that he may give eternal life to all whom thou hast given him... I have glorified thee on the earth ... And now glorify thou me, O Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with thee... And all my things are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them ... that they may be one, as we also are ... That they all may be one, as thou, Father, in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us ... And the glory which thou hast given me, I have given to them; that they may be one, as we also are one: I in them, and thou in me; that they may be made perfect in one ... I will that where I am, they also whom thou hast given me may be with me; that they may see my glory which thou hast given me, because thou hast loved me before the creation of the world."

Simply quoting the text doesn't solve the logical dilemma.

The theologian Karl Rahner (1904-1984) sees creation as receiving God's self-communication, and that the human being is actually constituted by this divine self-communication. He identifies grace – or "glory' as per John 17 – with the self-communication of God:

"God wishes to communicate himself, to pour forth the love which he himself is... And so God makes a creature whom he can love: he creates man. He creates him in such a way that he can receive this Love which is God himself, and that he can and must at the same time accept it for what it is: the ever astounding wonder, the unexpected, unexacted gift ... Thus in this second respect God must so create man that love does not only pour forth free and unexacted, but also so that man as real partner, as one who can accept or reject it, can experience and accept it as the unexacted event and wonder not owed to him ... "
(Karl Rahner (1904-1984) Theological Investigations, vol. 1, pp. 310-311.)

Participation in divine life or sharing in God's glory (self-communication in your view) is different from possessing the same divine essence in the way the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do. You're describing a deep union, but not necessarily an ontological identity that would make believers part of the Godhead. How does Rahner's concept specifically address the as comparison in John 17.11, 22 without leading to the absurdity McClellan pointed out? How does shared glory avoid the expansion of the Trinity?

Colossians 1:15 refers to the Son as the "firstborn of creation" the Greek: "ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως" can be translated as 'of every creature the firstborn' or 'born prior to all creation (every creature).' It goes on to say "... all things were created through him and for him; and he is before all things, and by him all things consist" (v16-17).

So here we have an ontological unity and a hierarchy – the Son is of the Father, and in like manner all creation is of the Son. Like, but dissimilar in that all creation is caused to be, whereas the Father, Son (and Holy Spirit) are eternal. (We might say that all logoi exist 'eternally', in an attenuated sense, in the Logos.)

Does this resolve the illogical dilemma? As far as I can tell, you're suggesting different levels of being of another. If the oneness in John 10.30 is ontological consubstantiality at the level of the Father and Son, how does the believers' unity in a hierarchical structure still qualify as "even as we are one" without implying a shared divine essence that includes countless individuals? Are you suggesting different kinds of ontological unity, and if so, how does that align with traditional Trinitarian theology?

"The glory which though hast given me, I have given to them, that they may be one even as we are one (in that glory)” (John 17:22).

Love underpins and sustains our being, we are founded in and of love. Jesus is recalling us to that ontological vocation.

You state that Jesus is recalling us to an ontological vocation rooted in love. The problem is it doesn't define the precise nature of this ontological link in relation to the Trinity's unique ontological unity. The even as comparison demands more than just a shared concept of love or glory; it implies a similarity in the way the Father and Son are one and the way believers are to be one with them (John 17.11, 22). How does this ontological vocation avoid the logical conclusion that believers would, in some way or another, share the divine essence in a way that expands the Trinity?

 

[muhammad_isa]

Well, I'd not go so far as to assume God does not love what He causes to be.

That's right .. "and G-d saw that it was good" .

 

[Thomas]

Only if you consider the tradition valid. The tradition might need to be re-examined . . .

The Tradition is constantly under examination – that's what makes it a living tradition.

The dilemma still stands: what kind of unity is being compared? If the oneness in John 10.30 is ontological consubstantiality, then the as in John 17 logically implies that believers would also share in that same ontological being. You haven't explained how this doesn't lead to the illogical absurdity of countless individuals becoming part of the divine essence and expanding the Trinity.

Because that is, as you rightly observe, an illogical absurdity. So clearly something else is implied.

Theosis, the logical implication of John 17, is participation in the Divine Life, by participating in does not mean consubstantial with.

Simply quoting the text doesn't solve the logical dilemma.

In reading Scripture, one has to consider the nature of Revelation, and regard it as given that what is revealed might not fit neatly into pre-determined logical categories.

In 1 Corinthians 2:9, Paul cites Isaiah 64:4:
"Rather, as has been written, “Things that eye has not seen and that ear has not heard and that have not risen up upon the heart of a human
being, whatsoever God has prepared for those who love him.”
What both are saying here is that the Divine Life surpasses what we can reasonably imagine of it.

Paul goes on (v10-11):
"For God has given us revelation by the Spirit (pneuma); for the Spirit (pneuma) searches all things, even the depths of God. For who knows the things of men except the man’s spirit (pneuma ho anthropos), which is within him? So also no one has known the things of God except the Spirit of God (pneuma ho theos)" – Speaking of revelation, and further, (v12) – "And we received not the spirit of the cosmos (pneuma ho cosmos), but rather the Spirit that is from God (pneuma ho ek theos), so that we might know the things graciously given us by God."

Does this resolve the illogical dilemma?

I think so.

As far as I can tell, you're suggesting different levels of being of another. If the oneness in John 10.30 is ontological consubstantiality at the level of the Father and Son, how does the believers' unity in a hierarchical structure still qualify as "even as we are one" without implying a shared divine essence that includes countless individuals? Are you suggesting different kinds of ontological unity, and if so, how does that align with traditional Trinitarian theology?

The divine essence is not 'shared out' is the Trinity, but it is 'shared in' with regard to created natures.

This totally aligns with Trinitarian theology, from Irenaeus on.

You state that Jesus is recalling us to an ontological vocation rooted in love. The problem is it doesn't define the precise nature of this ontological link in relation to the Trinity's unique ontological unity.

Nor can it, because words cannot express it.

The best we can hope for, is to contemplate Scripture:
"One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all." (Ephesians 4:6)

"Yet for us there is one God, the Father – out of whom come all things, and we for him – and one Lord, Jesus the Anointed – through
whom come all things, and we through him." (1 Corinthians 8:6)

"And having donned the new man, who is renewed in full knowledge, according to the image of the one creating him, where there is no Greek
and Judaean ... rather, the Christ is all things and is in all." (Colossian 3:10-11)

+++

If we're talking Trinity, then we're talking Persons, and then this unity in the Trinity is 'person to person' in which both parties, Christ and creature, retain their identities, Christ as Uncreate source of all being, the Person from whom all personhood derives, and the human person as a created instance of personhood ... it is here that this unity takes place, and that which unites person and the Person, the "i" and the "Thou", is love, that is nothing other than the complete gift and complete acceptance of the one to the other ... in which, as Eckhart said, 'all distinction disappears'.

 

[Tony Bristow-Stagg]

Well, I'd not go so far as to assume God does not love what He causes to be.

The point is we are not what we are wearing, the apparel is a necessary part of our development and is perfect for its given purpose, the apparel will always become outworn.

Regards Tony

 

[Tony Bristow-Stagg]

That's right .. "and G-d saw that it was good" .

It is definitly perfect for its given purpose, In this reality.

Regards Tony

 

[Thomas]

The point is we are not what we are wearing, the apparel is a necessary part of our development and is perfect for its given purpose, the apparel will always become outworn.

It is definitly perfect for its given purpose, In this reality.

Absolutely! And such is the case at every degree and mode of manifestation.

Eriugena: The Five Modes of Being and Non-Being according to the Periphyseon (I.443c-446a)
The first mode: things accessible to the senses and the intellect are said to be, whereas anything which, “through the excellence of its nature”, transcends our faculties are said not to be.

The second mode: if one level of nature is said to be, those orders above or below it, are said not to be.

The third mode: contrasts the being of actual things with the 'non-being' of possible things still contained in their causes.

The fourth mode: things contemplated by the intellect alone may be considered to be, whereas things caught up in generation and corruption, viz. matter, place and time, do not truly exist.

The fifth mode: those sanctified by grace are said to be, whereas sinners who have renounced the divine image are said not to be.

Notes:
'Being' and 'non-being' are treated as correlative categories: something may be said to be under one mode and not to be under another.

God is "nothingness on account of excellence" or "nothingness on account of infinity”.

Matter is “nothing through privation” (nihil per privationem).

Created things are nothing because they do not contain in themselves their principles of subsistence.

 

[Ahanu]

The Tradition is constantly under examination – that's what makes it a living tradition.

Remember, you said: "'The glory which though hast given me, I have given to them, that they may be one even as we are one (in that glory)' (John 17:22).

Love underpins and sustains our being, we are founded in and of love. Jesus is recalling us to that ontological vocation."

Why are you focused on glory alone? You emphasize "glory" in John 17:22, but McClellan's analysis of John's Gospel with his focus on John 17:11 notes the importance of the divine name in achieving unity. It reads: "protect them by Your name . . . that they may be one as We are one." McClellan argues that the reception and possession of the divine name is what facilitates the unity between Jesus and the Father, and extends to the disciples. You've overlooked the significance of the divine name.

This vocation is not about believers merging with the divine essence. It's about being brought into a relationship with God through Christ, who possesses the divine name and authority.

Theosis, the logical implication of John 17, is participation in the Divine Life, by participating in does not mean consubstantial with.

The unity in John 17, "one as we are one," could be understood as a shared divine agency and presence facilitated by Jesus's endowment with the divine name, not an ontological participation in the Divine Life in the sense you mean.

In reading Scripture, one has to consider the nature of Revelation, and regard it as given that what is revealed might not fit neatly into pre-determined logical categories.

In 1 Corinthians 2:9, Paul cites Isaiah 64:4:
"Rather, as has been written, “Things that eye has not seen and that ear has not heard and that have not risen up upon the heart of a human
being, whatsoever God has prepared for those who love him.”
What both are saying here is that the Divine Life surpasses what we can reasonably imagine of it.

Or the significance of the divine name were understandable within the first-century Jewish worldview. Appealing to the idea that it defies all logic might overlook the understandable framework already present in the first century.

Paul goes on (v10-11):
"For God has given us revelation by the Spirit (pneuma); for the Spirit (pneuma) searches all things, even the depths of God. For who knows the things of men except the man’s spirit (pneuma ho anthropos), which is within him? So also no one has known the things of God except the Spirit of God (pneuma ho theos)" – Speaking of revelation, and further, (v12) – "And we received not the spirit of the cosmos (pneuma ho cosmos), but rather the Spirit that is from God (pneuma ho ek theos), so that we might know the things graciously given us by God."


I think so.

The dilemma is better resolved in my opinion by understanding the Christology of John's Gospel through the lens of first-century Jewish concepts like divine agency and the endowment with the divine name, which provided a way to see Jesus as uniquely connected to God without equating him ontologically in the way later Trinitarianism defined it.

The divine essence is not 'shared out' is the Trinity, but it is 'shared in' with regard to created natures.

This totally aligns with Trinitarian theology, from Irenaeus on.

McClellan's point about the first century not necessarily operating with the strict ontological dichotomies of creator/created that underpin later Trinitarian theology is strongly supported by Paula Fredrikson's analysis as well. Fredrikson explains that the philosophical understanding of creation ex nihilo - creation out of absolute nothing - which became crucial for later classical Christology, was actually a development of the second century CE, driven by debates about the nature of matter. In the first century, as Fredrikson notes, even when thinkers talked about creation "out of nothing" (ek mē ontos), it often implied a relative non-being or unformed matter. This suggests that the sharp division between a singular creator and absolutely distinct creation, which seems to inform your understanding, was not a framework in the time of Jesus and the early apostles.

If we're talking Trinity, then we're talking Persons, and then this unity in the Trinity is 'person to person' in which both parties, Christ and creature, retain their identities, Christ as Uncreate source of all being, the Person from whom all personhood derives, and the human person as a created instance of personhood ... it is here that this unity takes place, and that which unites person and the Person, the "i" and the "Thou", is love, that is nothing other than the complete gift and complete acceptance of the one to the other ... in which, as Eckhart said, 'all distinction disappears'.

Again, your sharp ontological distinction between the Uncreated and the created is something that Paula Fredrikson argues was not as clearly defined in the first century CE. The fully developed concept of creation ex nihilo, which strongly reinforces this dichotomy you present, was a later development of the second century and beyond.

You are reading a later, more defined ontological framework back into the first-century context of John's Gospel, which McClellan suggests should be understood through the lens of divine agency and the possession of the divine name - a framework that doesn't necessarily presuppose such a rigid ontological separation.

 

[Ahanu]

McClellan's point about the first century not necessarily operating with the strict ontological dichotomies of creator/created that underpin later Trinitarian theology is strongly supported by Paula Fredrikson's analysis as well. Fredrikson explains that the philosophical understanding of creation ex nihilo - creation out of absolute nothing - which became crucial for later classical Christology, was actually a development of the second century CE, driven by debates about the nature of matter. In the first century, as Fredrikson notes, even when thinkers talked about creation "out of nothing" (ek mē ontos), it often implied a relative non-being or unformed matter. This suggests that the sharp division between a singular creator and absolutely distinct creation, which seems to inform your understanding, was not a framework in the time of Jesus and the early apostles.



Again, your sharp ontological distinction between the Uncreated and the created is something that Paula Fredrikson argues was not as clearly defined in the first century CE. The fully developed concept of creation ex nihilo, which strongly reinforces this dichotomy you present, was a later development of the second century and beyond.

McClellan states in one of his works the following: "My fundamental concern with Bauckham’s model is the fact that these strict dichotomies simply cannot be shown to have been in circulation in the first century CE. The two most problematic are his notion of 'identity,' which he acknowledges is drawn from contemporary Christian theologizing,2 and his ontological dichotomy of the creator over and against 'all other reality,' which is a philosophical principle that presupposes creation ex nihilo, a reflective innovation of the second century CE (May 1994; Young 1991; Hubler 1995; cf. Niehoff 2005; Frederiksen 2020)."

 

[TheLightWithin]

The point here being that the majority of Christians, who were not philosophers nor theologians, believed in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost as One, but had no idea as to how technically that could be so ... and the same, I would suggest, is a general rule today in the Trinitarian churches – that ask your average believer to explain the Trinity and within 30 seconds they'll be talking heresy – I say this because that's what happened to us on our degree course.

Which makes me wonder how serious "heresy" can really be... nobody can avoid it for even a minute.

 

[TheLightWithin]

1: Christianity, from the outset, can be said to declare that a belief in 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit', and a baptism in the name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit are conditional upon entering the community. In that sense, there is a body of people who acknowledge One God, and yet in effect swear allegiance to 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit', yet do not see themselves as transgressing the First Commandment.

It seems the ideas about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit must have all been early ideas, but without anything in writing left by Jesus to clarify, it took centuries of philosophical development in order to reconcile the ideas. And then centuries defending them to get most people satisfied that the idea was correct - or being very harsh on "heretics" who begged to differ.

 

[Thomas]

Why are you focused on glory alone?

LOL, isn't that enough? What do you think it lacks?

... but McClellan's analysis of John's Gospel with his focus on John 17:11 notes the importance of the divine name in achieving unity...

As said elsewhere, I find McClellan's exegesis dubious, and I find his exegesis here as silly as he does.

You've overlooked the significance of the divine name.

I have never mentioned the Divine Name, nor do I overlook its significance, quite the opposite, but my view on that is more mystical than philosophical.

This vocation is not about believers merging with the divine essence.

Well there you go ... exit McClellan ...

It's about being brought into a relationship with God through Christ, who possesses the divine name and authority.

And being.

The unity in John 17, "one as we are one," could be understood as a shared divine agency and presence facilitated by Jesus's endowment with the divine name, not an ontological participation in the Divine Life in the sense you mean.

It could be ...

Or the significance of the divine name were understandable within the first-century Jewish worldview. Appealing to the idea that it defies all logic might overlook the understandable framework already present in the first century.

Saul of Tarsus was working from the understandable framework of the first century ... and then something happened.

The dilemma is better resolved in my opinion by understanding the Christology of John's Gospel through the lens of first-century Jewish concepts like divine agency and the endowment with the divine name, which provided a way to see Jesus as uniquely connected to God without equating him ontologically in the way later Trinitarianism defined it.

OK. Your opinion.

... This suggests that the sharp division between a singular creator and absolutely distinct creation, which seems to inform your understanding.

That's not my understanding.

Again, your sharp ontological distinction between the Uncreated and the created is ...

... not as sharp as you suppose it to be.

The fully developed concept of creation ex nihilo, which strongly reinforces this dichotomy you present, was a later development of the second century and beyond.

Do you believe in God as a substance in the material sense?

You are reading a later, more defined ontological framework back into the first-century context of John's Gospel ...

I rather think a reading of a more refined ontological framework out of John's Gospel.

The question then is does that view conflict or contradict that Gospel?

 

[Thomas]

It seems the ideas about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit must have all been early ideas ...

Yes, they were.

... it took centuries of philosophical development in order to reconcile the ideas.

W-e-l-l ... the philosophical/theological development was a process over time. The basic belief in Father, Son and Holy Spirit was a given, what evolved was through dialogue and dispute regarding the nature of the relation of the Three.

 

[Ahanu]

LOL, isn't that enough? What do you think it lacks?

By focusing on verse 22 and glory alone, you overlook the specific unity mentioned earlier in the chapter (verse 11) - the divine name. McClellan specifically points to Jesus's prayer in John 17.11 in his video: "Holy Father, protect them in your name that you have given me, that they may be one as we are one." McClellan's argument is that the reception and possession of the divine name is presented as the means by which this oneness is achieved, both between the Father and Son and extended to the disciples. There is no need to posit different types of oneness, and there is no need to rely solely on glory in verse 22. Rather, McClellan's view shows a unity of agency, authority, and divine presence, consistent with first-century Jewish understandings of intermediaries bearing God's name.

 

[Thomas]

By focusing on verse 22 and glory alone, you overlook the specific unity mentioned earlier in the chapter (verse 11) - the divine name.

Immaterial – McClellan is arguing that oneness in the Father means consubstantiality with the Father, as the Son is, and so the Trinity becomes a multiplicity of as many as included in it ... McClellan declares this argument "kind of silly, I've never seen anyone argue for that position" ( at 5.26-32) and, as I have said, it is silly, and furthermore no-one suggests it, so this non-argument is a Straw Man of McClellan's own fabrication.

He then immediately goes on to say "there's another reason we know that John 10:30 is not Jesus saying I am God" (5:32) and we may suppose this 'reason' is as silly and spurious as the one previously mentioned.

He rests his following argument on the basis that there is a distinction between claiming to be 'God', and claiming to be 'Divine', and that there's nothing wrong with claiming to be Divine, while there is everything wrong with claiming to be God, etc., which misses the point – His audience picked up stones because He said "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30)

McClellan specifically points to Jesus's prayer in John 17.11 in his video: "Holy Father, protect them in your name that you have given me, that they may be one as we are one." McClellan's argument is that the reception and possession of the divine name is presented as the means by which this oneness is achieved, both between the Father and Son and extended to the disciples. There is no need to posit different types of oneness, and there is no need to rely solely on glory in verse 22. Rather, McClellan's view shows a unity of agency, authority, and divine presence, consistent with first-century Jewish understandings of intermediaries bearing God's name.

Well, as argued above, McClellan tends to Straw Man and then offer a false dichotomy arguments. In short, I don't find his exegesis anywhere near conclusive or compelling.

But to go back to your "glory alone", again this seems to be your reading of my meaning ... Might I recall John 1:14:
"And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth" – to which my comment, is being in the Son not sufficient?

The French theologian Jean Daniélou proposed that John's "the Word ... dwelt among us,” may be based on an older form, “the Name ... dwelt among us,” noting that in the Hebrew Scriptures, “such dwelling is in fact the property of the Name, and not of the Word” (Daniélou, Theology of Jewish Christianity, p150, n.15.)

John 12:28: "Father, glorify your Name." Lutheran theologian Charles Gieschen says: "Jesus also identified himself as the one who is a hypostasis of the divine Name" (Gieschen, Angelomorphic Christology, 272). He further suggests that Jesus’ acclamation "is not simply a pious prayer that God's name be glorified through Christ's sacrifice; it is the identification of Jesus as the one who possesses the divine Name. This indicates that he can simply be identified as ‘the Name,’ much like the visible manifestations of YHWH of Deuteronomy and Jeremiah" (Gieschen, The Name of the Son of Man in the Parables of Enoch, 246).

Daniélou draws attention to another important testimony found in John 17:6: “I have made your name known to those whom you gave me from the world. They were yours, and you gave them to me, and they have kept your word.” Analysing this passage, Daniélou suggests that "in the Gospel of John we are presented with a theological elaboration in which the Name has come to designate Christ. Christ manifests the Name of the Father (John 17:6), but this manifestation is his own person." (Daniélou, 149)

Gieschen argues that the distinctive “Name nomenclature” was used to identify Jesus elsewhere in the Johannine corpus and other early Christian literature (Gieschen, Angelomorphic Christology). In his opinion, “this Name nomenclature is closely linked with the use of ἐγώ εἰμι in the LXX as a name for YHWH. Jesus uses ἐγώ εἰμι to identify himself on several occasions in John, including epiphanies where the power of the divine Name is visible in actions, such as the stilling of the storm (6:20) and the falling back of the arresting crowd in the Garden of Gethsemane (18:5)" (Gieschen, Angelomorphic Christology, 272-3. See also Gieschen, The Divine Name in the Ante-Nicene Christology, 135-142).

The Unity of the Father and the Son is in the Spirit, it is a Tri-Unity, and as such all-encompassing as nothing exists or can exist 'outside God' as it were.

 

[Ahanu]

Immaterial – McClellan is arguing that oneness in the Father means consubstantiality with the Father, as the Son is, and so the Trinity becomes a multiplicity of as many as included in it ... McClellan declares this argument "kind of silly, I've never seen anyone argue for that position" ( at 5.26-32) and, as I have said, it is silly, and furthermore no-one suggests it, so this non-argument is a Straw Man of McClellan's own fabrication.

McClellan says: "So, if I and the Father are one means we share the same substance but are distinct in person, then that will extend to include the disciples as well who will all become consubstantial with Jesus and the Father and distinguished in person. In other words, the Trinity will take on countless additional persons hypostases even as the substance remains one. That's kind of silly. I've never seen anyone argue for that position on John 10.30."

It is not a "non-argument." It is a conditional argument.

McClellan is presenting this scenario as a logical consequence if one interprets "I and the Father are one" (John 10.30) solely through the lens of ontological consubstantiality and then applies the same logic to Jesus' prayer for his disciples to be one "as we are one" (John 17.11, 22). He is not necessarily claiming that Trinitarians explicitly argue for the disciples becoming part of the Trinity in this way. Rather, he's highlighting what he sees as a problematic implication of that particular interpretation of John 10.30 when considered alongside John 17. Therefore, John 10.30 must mean something else.

He then immediately goes on to say "there's another reason we know that John 10:30 is not Jesus saying I am God" (5:32) and we may suppose this 'reason' is as silly and spurious as the one previously mentioned.

He rests his following argument on the basis that there is a distinction between claiming to be 'God', and claiming to be 'Divine', and that there's nothing wrong with claiming to be Divine, while there is everything wrong with claiming to be God, etc., which misses the point – His audience picked up stones because He said "I and the Father are one" (John 10:30)

Your dismissal here is solely based on what the mob thinks. They picked up stones specifically because he said "I and the Father are one" (John 10.30). Jesus often speaks symbolically and his audience takes his words literally. We've already seen the theme of misunderstanding at work throughout John's Gospel. Why trust the mob? Why accept their reaction as definitive?

Again, interpreting Jesus's words solely through the lens of the mob's reaction is a risky bet. Just because they picked up stones doesn't mean they reflected Jesus' intended meaning. Jesus' saying here can be understood as an encoded reference to divine self-identification and Jesus claiming to be the authorized possessor of the divine name, God's image and agent, speaking on God's behalf, without necessarily claiming ontological identity as the singular God of Israel.

 

[Thomas]

McClellan says ...

I've already said I think McClellan's argument is a Straw Man. He says it's silly, and no-one makes it ... so why does he?

And from there he derives a false conclusion, that having proved this reading as silly, the only logical one is his. It's a false dichotomy – and I don't accept his reasoning, because he's mis-directing his audience.

McClellan is presenting this scenario as a logical consequence ...

I know. I think it's a false premise.

... if one interprets "I and the Father are one" (John 10.30) solely through the lens of ontological consubstantiality and then applies the same logic to Jesus' prayer for his disciples to be one "as we are one" (John 17.11, 22).

Which no-one does ...

He is not necessarily claiming that Trinitarians explicitly argue for the disciples becoming part of the Trinity in this way.

Nor is anyone else.

Rather, he's highlighting what he sees as a problematic implication of that particular interpretation of John 10.30 when considered alongside John 17.

If someone were to make that error ... which no-one does.

Therefore, John 10.30 must mean something else.

Quite ... just not what McClellan thinks it means.

Your dismissal here is solely based on what the mob thinks.

Well what other grounds re there?

They picked up stones specifically because he said "I and the Father are one" (John 10.30).

Yes.

Jesus often speaks symbolically and his audience takes his words literally.

Often does not necessarily mean 'on this occasion'.

We've already seen the theme of misunderstanding at work throughout John's Gospel. Why trust the mob? Why accept their reaction as definitive?

Why report it in the gospel?

Jesus' saying here can be understood as an encoded reference to divine self-identification and Jesus claiming to be the authorized possessor of the divine name, God's image and agent, speaking on God's behalf, without necessarily claiming ontological identity as the singular God of Israel.

Again a contextual point.

Jesus uses ego eimi many times, 24 times in John, but then so does anyone who says 'I am', but the phrase is always used with a predicate, such as when Jesus says "I am the good shepherd", or when the blind beggar in John 9:9 says "I am", the predicate is implied, because in context some are saying he's not the man who was born blind, and his 'I am' is his reply.

But there are three occasions when Jesus uses the "I am" without predicate –
“They saw Jesus walking on the sea… and they were frightened. But he said to them, “It is I (ἐγώ εἰμι); do not be afraid.”” (John 6:19-20)
“Truly, truly I say to you: before Abraham was, I am (ἐγώ εἰμι).” (John 8:58).
Both times the phrase is used as divine self-identification.

At His arrest in the garden, Jesus asks "'Whom do you seek?' They answered 'Jesus of Nazareth.' Jesus answered 'I am he (ἐγώ εἰμι).' … when Jesus said to them 'I am he (ἐγώ εἰμι),' they retreated and fell to the ground… Jesus answered 'I told you that I am he (ἐγώ εἰμι).'” (John 18:4-8)
Again, undeniable here, else why would the soldiers sent to arrest Him 'fall back'?

+++

We can talk in terms of 'agency' or 'ontology', but really the theology of Israel at this stage was quite fuzzy – but that does not thereby invalidate or necessarily rule anything out – and in the New Testament the message is clearly one of Jesus' self-identification with the Father, and this is explicit in John.

In the Burning Bush (a transfiguration) account in Exodus, we read:
3:2: "And the angel (מַלְאָךְ) of the LORD appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush ...
3:4: "God called unto him out of the midst of the bush ...
3:6: "Moreover he said, I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob... "

So what starts off as an angel ends up as God. And whatever one chooses to discern whether God speaks, or God speaks through an angel, the ground upon which Moses stands is 'holy ground' (3:5) – Moses is in the presence of the Divine.

The argument boils down to wether one accepts Jesus as the Incarnate Son with all that such implies, or whether one chooses to rationalise the implication in such a way as to fit some other context ... it's as simple as that ... I believe the former, you the latter, and no argument we can present is going to sway the other.

+++

We've gone from the influence of Greek philosophy on the doctrine of the Trinity to a general rebuttal of the doctrine as such, and now we're arguing click-bait arguments (albeit from a well-informed Mormon scholar) to refute Christology ... I think in that context this discussion has run its mile?

When the Father reveals Himself, it is an act of the Divine Being, so the Divine Being is Itself prior to all modes of Revelation, and in that sense is a secret, even unto Himself, or rather a secret known only to Himself.

When and wherever the Father reveals Himself, it is the Son who reveals, and the Son who is, however discreetly, revealed.

 

[Ahanu]

I've already said I think McClellan's argument is a Straw Man. He says it's silly, and no-one makes it ... so why does he?

I've already said in my own indirect way that it is wrong to believe his argument is a straw man. It's not a straw man. He is using a reductio ad absurdum argument, which he frames using conditional arguments.

He's not saying Trinitarians do believe this expansion of the Trinity. He uses this hypothetical ("silly") outcome to argue that the initial premise - interpreting "I and the Father are one" only as ontological consubstantiality - must be flawed. By focusing on what he considers to be an absurd implication, McClellan aims to show us that the interpretation of John 10.30 as a claim of ontological consubstantiality - in the later philosophical sense - is problematic when considered in light of John 17. It's as simple as that. Even if the conclusion is not a real position, the reductio still functions to question the initial, narrow interpretation of John 10.30.

Recall he critiques interpreting John 10.30 through the lens of later philosophical developments. He states that this later philosophical view "was not available to the author or authors of the Gospel of John toward the end of the first century CE." McClellan's tactic consistently returns to the text of John itself, related passages in the Old Testament, and the historical and cultural context of the first century to understand Jesus's claims, rather than directly engaging with interpretations formulated by later Church Fathers. In other words, he is interpreting John with John.

And from there he derives a false conclusion, that having proved this reading as silly, the only logical one is his. It's a false dichotomy – and I don't accept his reasoning, because he's mis-directing his audience.

See above.

I know. I think it's a false premise.

I am not surprised.

Which no-one does ...

Okay.

Nor is anyone else.

Okay.

If someone were to make that error ... which no-one does.

Okay.

Quite ... just not what McClellan thinks it means.

Again, I am not surprised.

Well what other grounds re there?

To rely solely on the crowd's reaction without considering the literary theme is, well, to use a popular word recently, silly. The crowd could have misunderstood Jesus.

The point about the crowd's reaction reminds me of something you said earlier. You commented that "John could well mean Jesus is ontologically one with God," but "he simply hasn't had reason to get into a dialogue about the technicalities of that claim." Isn't it also possible that Jesus could well have meant something else entirely by saying "I and the Father are one" in John 10.30 - something that the crowd didn't grasp at all - but, just as you suggested about John's possible intended meaning, he simply didn't have the chance to get into an in-depth discussion about it because they immediately picked up stones? "For this people’s heart has grown callous; they hardly hear with their ears, and they have closed their eyes. Otherwise they might see with their eyes, hear with their ears, understand with their hearts, and turn, and I would heal them." The immediate and hostile reaction of the crowd that is attempting to stone Jesus could be seen as a manifestation of this "calloused heart" and closed eyes. Their preconceived notions about God might have prevented them from considering alternative interpretations of Jesus's claim.

McClellan's analysis certainly leans this way . . . He argues that the crowd interpreted Jesus as "making yourself God" (or "a god"), but Jesus's response, quoting "I said, 'You are gods' from Psalm 82.6, suggests he wasn't directly claiming to be the singular God of Israel in the way the crowd understood it.

Yes.


Often does not necessarily mean 'on this occasion'.

But there are specific elements in this very occasion that strongly suggest the crowd did indeed misunderstand Jesus's intended meaning.

The Jewish people picked up stones specifically because they said, "it is not for a good work that we are going to stone you, but for blasphemy, because you, though only a human, are making yourself God." This indicates their interpretation of Jesus's words was a direct claim to be God.

Instead of directly stating, "Yes, I am the singular God of Israel," Jesus replied by quoting Psalm 82.6: "I said, 'You are gods.'" McClellan argues this response suggests Jesus was defending his claim to divine status as the Son of God, drawing a parallel to how scripture refers to other humans as "gods" (divine beings) because they received the word of God. This implies Jesus was operating within a different framework of understanding divinity than the one the crowd immediately jumped to.

To ignore this recurring theme of misunderstanding when analyzing the crowd's reaction in John 10 would be to overlook a significant characteristic of John's narrative style.

I have strong grounds to believe that the crowd did indeed misinterpret Jesus's statement on this occasion. Just because they reacted strongly doesn't automatically validate their interpretation of his words.

Why report it in the gospel?

Well, the crowd's accusation of blasphemy leads to Jesus's citation of Psalm 82.6. Understanding what people were thinking helps us understand why he reacted the way he did.

Also, these misunderstandings serves as a cautionary tale for later readers . . . If we simply accept the immediate reactions of Jesus's audience as definitive, we risk perpetuating those same misunderstandings . . .

 

[TheLightWithin]

Debates about the Trinity almost always center on Christology. Once in awhile pneumatology figures in (But usually only if someone brings up the idea of Binitarianism by contrast)

Almost never is Paterology mentioned.

It's almost as if God as he might have been known or thought of amongst the Jews, disappears or fades into the background in Christian theology.

One of the reasons I am baffled by the concept of the trinity is to me it feels like it conceals God, even if, at least hypothetically, it is considered a way to reveal God.

Oneness Pentecostals resolve this differently than to Binitarians or Biblical Unitarians.

 

[Thomas]

I've already said in my own indirect way that it is wrong to believe his argument is a straw man. It's not a straw man. He is using a reductio ad absurdum argument, which he frames using conditional arguments.

OK, I stand corrected.

He's not saying Trinitarians do believe this expansion of the Trinity. He uses this hypothetical ("silly") outcome to argue that the initial premise - interpreting "I and the Father are one" only as ontological consubstantiality - must be flawed.

A silly argument does not affect the initial premise of the nature of the oneness between the Father and the Son.

Paul speaks of divine sonship 'by adoption' and Peter as 'partakers of the divine nature' (2 Peter 1:4 – although probably not Peter, but still dated 60-150AD, contemporary with if not prior to John, before any theology of divine participation was fully worked out).

And McClellan make not mention of the sending of the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, which lays something of a conditional foundation for this mutual indwelling between Father, Son and believers. (cf John 10:16)

By focusing on what he considers to be an absurd implication, McClellan aims to show us that the interpretation of John 10.30 as a claim of ontological consubstantiality - in the later philosophical sense - is problematic when considered in light of John 17. It's as simple as that.

It's only problematic if one assumes 'ontological consubstantiality' ...

McClellan mentions this 'mutual indwelling' a dozen times, but apart from arguing what it can't be, never offers any suggestion of what it might be.

Recall he critiques interpreting John 10.30 through the lens of later philosophical developments.

Pointing out bad scholarship doesn't validate his own.

McClellan's tactic consistently returns to the text of John itself ... In other words, he is interpreting John with John.

Well he's interpreting John with McClellan, let's be fair.

Examples:
at 0.12 "So the first scripture is John 10:30 that’s a pretty short one it is Jesus just saying I and the father are one if this is Jesus claiming to be God then the sense must be I and the father are one in substance or essence but not in person...”
McClellan accepts, as do scholars, that Jews and Christians at the time saw a hierarchy of divinity, of the God and gods, (with or without the definite article), so it's unlikely John meant 'one in substance or essence' ... I find his mode or argument somewhat disingenuous, but that might be my critical reasoning.

And I rather think had I said that, I would be accused of reading 4th century terminology onto John ...

at 5:32 “there’s another reason we know that John 10:30 is not Jesus saying I am God ...”
But Jesus never says ‘I am God’, He says ‘I and the Father are one’. There is a distinction. (Is this an example of a Straw Man?)

at 6:37 "this argument doesn't really make any sense if it's trying to defend the claim that Jesus is the very God of Israel ...
Again, John is not saying that. he claims a filial relation to God at John 10:36. For this, his audience seek to stone him, for that blasphemy.

McClellan’s counter-argument seems to rest on the common mis-translation of John 10:35 “being a man, makest thyself God” (KJV).
A more accurate translation – Hart's for instance, reads “and because you who are a man make yourself out to be a god.” Suffice to say Hart offers a better translation, but still reads the thrust of the text as Jesus' claim to divine status.

McClellan goes on:
7.11 “Jesus is pointing out there’s nothing blasphemous about a human claiming divinity, claiming to be divine, not claiming to be God but claiming divinity to be divine ... “
This seems to me somewhat disingenuous. Why did His audience seek to stone Him?

Hart offer a much more logical and likely reason. His translation reads:
“Jesus answered them, “Is it not written in your Law ‘I said, “You are gods”? If he called gods those to whom God’s Logos came, and the scripture cannot be dissolved, how is it that, because I have said I am the Son of God, you say, ‘You blaspheme’ to one whom the Father sanctified and sent out into the cosmos?" (John 10:34-36)

Note that most translations say “unto whom the word of God came) (v35), whereas Hart (whom McClellan favours, by the way) uses ‘Logos’. I offer his commentary on the text:
“It was a belief among many Jewish and Christian thinkers of late antiquity that the Logos of God – which is to say, that mediating divine principle or agency whereby the Father expressed himself in created reality – was the direct subject of all the theophanies and divine visitations narrated in Hebrew scripture; for God in his proper, “Most High” reality was beyond all immediate contact with the created order. For Christians, this meant that these Old Testament revelations of God, from Genesis through Ezekiel and beyond, were acts of the divine Son before his incarnation, as the one who is the “express image” of the Father, and so the one in whom the Father is seen. I have therefore translated the verse as a reference to the Logos of the theophanies.”

This understanding, specifically the idea of God Most High being above all, and His intervention in the world being through divine intermediaries, it is these intermediaries who can claim divine status, not all and sundry. In the Scriptures these were angels, prophets, priests and/or kings – God the Father’s chosen instruments, and one cannot claim to be a chosen instrument lightly. The ‘Judeans’ (as Hart sees them as a faction, not Judaism per se), saw Jesus as merely a man, not an angel, prophet, priest or king ... hence blasphemy.

In short, both reasons McClellan argues Jesus not claiming to be God are not conclusive.