Brian,
You raise many points in many posts. It's difficult to quote them all, so, if there's a point I've missed, please raise it again.
Before I discuss some of the broader issues you raise, I should first point out that, in general, Baha'is are allowed to participate in civil elections. The issue is partisanship. For example, in many states in the US, before one can vote in a primary election, one must declare a party affiliation. The State of Washington is one of these states, and I don't vote in primary elections. It is, however, the issue of partisanship that precludes my participation, not the electoral process per se.
I want to provide some context for the issues you raise by looking at the early history of the Baha'i Faith in America. The Baha'i Faith was first taught here in the early part of the 20th century by a gentleman named Ibrahim Khayrullah. His understanding of the basic teachings of the Baha'i Faith was rather limited. As a result, what he taught was an admixture of what Baha'u'llah actually taught and Khayrullah's own, personal ideas that really had no basis in Baha'u'llah's Writings.
in 1934, Shoghi Effendi, `Abdu'l-Baha's eldest grandson whom `Abdu'l-Baha had appointed as Guardian of the Baha'i Faith, wrote a letter to the Baha'is of the west. This letter is know by the title
The Dispensation of Baha'u'llah, and the primary purpose of that letter was to correct a number of these misconceptions first introduced by Khayrullah.
The letter has four sections. The first three expound on the stations and claims of Baha'u'llah, the Bab and `Abdu'l-Baha. The fourth section outlines the salient features of the Administrative Order. In that section, Shoghi Effendi clarifies the legislative function of the Universal House of Justice as contrasted with the interpretive function of the Guardianship:
From these statements it is made indubitably clear and evident that the Guardian of the Faith has been made the Interpreter of the Word and that the Universal House of Justice has been invested with the function of legislating on matters not expressly revealed in the teachings. The interpretation of the Guardian, functioning within his own sphere, is as authoritative and binding as the enactments of the International House of Justice, whose exclusive right and prerogative is to pronounce upon and deliver the final judgment on such laws and ordinances as Bahá'u'lláh has not expressly revealed. Neither can, nor will ever, infringe upon the sacred and prescribed domain of the other. Neither will seek to curtail the specific and undoubted authority with which both have been divinely invested.
This, then, provides a context for answering some of your questions, and there are a couple of features to this context. The first is this notion that the Baha'i Faith introduces a new form of exegesis not found anywhere else: authoritative interpretations of the Writings. Baha'u'llah explicitly granted exclusive authority to interpret His Writings to `Abdu'l-Baha. `Abdu'l-Baha, in exercise of that authority, both established the institution of the Guardianship and delineated several features of Baha'i Administration.
The second feature of this context is the limitations on the authority of the Universal House of Justice, in particular the fact that the Universal House of Justice has no authority to establish Baha'i doctrine. The Universal House of Justice legislates, has the authority to resolve matters that have caused differences within the community and administers the affairs of the Faith.
What, then, are the limitations, if any, on the exercise of individual conscience (which, I believe, gets to the heart of your questions)? In the absence of an interpretation by `Abdu'l-Baha or Shoghi Effendi, Baha'is a free to believe whatever we wish, just so long as we are clear that our statements of belief are personal and not necessarily universal to all Baha'is.
But, what if I disagree with one of the interpretations of `Abdu'l-Baha or Shoghi Effendi? After all, with all the baggage we each bring to a new faith, there are bound to be some of these interpretations that will be difficult to accept. When we encounter these differences, we must make a choice. Do I hold on to my personal ideas, or do I accept those interpretations that Baha'u'llah has said I must accept?
While I am struggling with such a question, I am free to remain affiliated with the Baha'i Faith. Indeed, so long as I don't attempt to influence the beliefs of other Baha'is, I'm even free to discuss the nature of my struggle with other Baha'is. The point where I start getting into trouble is when I start insisting that my personal ideas, or even ideas for which we might find a consensus within the Baha'i community, ought to be accepted in deference to any given authoritative interpretation. To insist that the Universal House of Justice promulgate an interpretation of the Writings that is contrary to one of `Abdu'l-Baha's or Shoghi Effendi's interpretations is to insist that the Universal House of Justice "infringe upon the sacred and proscribed domain" of the Guardianship.
The other broad category of questions you raise involves the extent to which Baha'i institutions are answerable to their constituencies. As you rightly point out, this is a feature of democracy. It is, however, also a feature that, as Shoghi Effendi notes, is specifically excluded from Baha'i practice. From that same letter I quoted above:
This new-born Administrative Order incorporates within its structure certain elements which are to be found in each of the three recognized forms of secular government, without being in any sense a mere replica of any one of them, and without introducing within its machinery any of the objectionable features which they inherently possess. It blends and harmonizes, as no government fashioned by mortal hands has as yet accomplished, the salutary truths which each of these systems undoubtedly contains without vitiating the integrity of those God-given verities on which it is ultimately founded.
The Administrative Order of the Faith of Bahá'u'lláh must in no wise be regarded as purely democratic in character inasmuch as the basic assumption which requires all democracies to depend fundamentally upon getting their mandate from the people is altogether lacking in this Dispensation. In the conduct of the administrative affairs of the Faith, in the enactment of the legislation necessary to supplement the laws of the Kitáb-i-Aqdas, the members of the Universal House of Justice, it should be borne in mind, are not, as Bahá'u'lláh's utterances clearly imply, responsible to those whom they represent, nor are they allowed to be governed by the feelings, the general opinion, and even the convictions of the mass of the faithful, or of those who directly elect them. They are to follow, in a prayerful attitude, the dictates and promptings of their conscience. They may, indeed they must, acquaint themselves with the conditions prevailing among the community, must weigh dispassionately in their minds the merits of any case presented for their consideration, but must reserve for themselves the right of an unfettered decision. "God will verily inspire them with whatsoever He willeth," is Bahá'u'lláh's incontrovertible assurance. They, and not the body of those who either directly or indirectly elect them, have thus been made the recipients of the divine guidance which is at once the life-blood and ultimate safeguard of this Revelation.
Those of us who have grown up within, and have been taught the values of, western democracy might think this a rather strange collection of affairs. How do we have institutions whose membership is elected, yet whose members do not answer to those who elect them? It would seem that the one is part-and-parcel of the other.
I think the answer to that question involves separating democratic theory from democratic practice. According to democratic theory, the views of the people have equal currency regardless of their actual constituency. In democratic practice, however, the weight that is given to the views of any particular constituency is directly proportional to the extent to which that constituency can ensure that anyone can get elected to office. In practice, democracy often devolves into a free-for-all competition between special interests.
Whether or not this free-for-all competition between special interests is a necessary evil to be accepted in an attempt to avoid the exercise of dictatorial authority is a question that's likely open to debate. The terms of that debate, however, hinge on whether or not the mere fact that officials are elected to positions of authority is sufficient to avoid the exercise of dictatorial authority. For Political Science buffs, I would suggest that this is a rather interesting question, but it's probably not a question we should be debating in this forum.
This does, however, delineate the relationship between individuals and institutions within the Baha'i Faith. The freedom of individuals to express their opinions is upheld, but individuals, in the expression of their views, must remain mindful of the fact that members of elected institutions are obligated, by the authoritative texts of our faith, to act according to the dictates of their conscience. The spark of truth comes from the clash of ideas, not the clash of competing interests.
It is in this context, i.e. the context of Baha'i consultation, that Baha'is are called upon to exercise what might be characterised as a "refined" form of conduct in the relationship between individuals and our institutions. This might, or might not, constitute a "better" form of relationship between an individual and the institutions of governance. It is, however, the the relationship Baha'is are striving to achieve. An oft-quoted statement of Shoghi Effendi's is:
Nothing short of the spirit of a true Baha'i can hope to reconcile the principles of mercy and justice, of freedom and submission, of the sanctity of the right of the individual and of self-surrender, of vigilance, discretion and prudence on the one hand, and fellowship, candour, and courage on the other.
Lastly, since I've pointed to the distiction between theory and practice in democracy, it's entirely legitimate to ask whether or not there is a similar difference between the theory and practice of Baha'i Administration. This one is difficult to answer, because there are certainly times when we've fallen short of the ideal expressed above.
When comparing the practice of Baha'i Administration with the practice of most western democracies, the reasons for any difference between theory and practice are not the same. In Baha'i Administration, the reason for the difference between theory and practice arises, because we Baha'is, as imperfect human beings, fail to live up to a difficult standard (or, at least, a standard that's difficult to achieve given assumptions prevalent in the society around us). In western democracies, the difference between theory and practice is ingrained in the design of the system. There is no real standard of conduct, outside of prohibitions on such things as fraud and bribery, that individuals must exercise in relation to the institutions of governance. And, arguably, the whole process of campaigning and electioneering might well be seen as nothing more than a legitimized form of bribery through campaign contributions.
In Baha'i Administration, we humans, with all our frailties and present-day immaturity, are the flaw. In western democracy, the system itself is flawed. This, at least, is my view, though I will readily admit that other views are as valid as mine. Political Science, while it can shed some light on these issues, has yet to advance to the point where it can provide definitive answers regarding some of the more subtle distinctions between Baha'i Administration and western democracy.
I think I'll stop now. My apologies for having been so verbose, but, faced with a choice between being succinct and being thorough, I felt it better to strive for the latter. Again, if there is an issue I've failed to address, please reiterate the question.
