A phone conversation with a muslim missionary

[rodgertutt]

Actually, according to the Quran, pious non-Muslims like Christians and Jews will be going to heaven. Also, the Quran also makes it pretty clear that hell is finite (something I am pretty sure I discussed on the Islam board). So it looks like Islam is already universal enough rodger. ;-)

Apparantly, just like in Christianity, there is a wide range of beliefs in Islam depending on differet interpretations of what the Quran means;
a range all the way from ultra-conservative (eternal suffering),
http://www.religionfacts.com/islam/beliefs/afterlife.htm

to liberal (all-inclusive salvation)

Quote from the link
"On the Last Day, resurrected humans and jinn will be judged by Allah according to their deeds. One's eternal destination depends on balance of good to bad deeds in life. They are either granted admission to Paradise, where they will enjoy spiritual and physical pleasures forever, or condemned to Hell to suffer spiritual and physical torment for eternity. The day of judgment is described as passing over Hell on a narrow bridge in order to enter Paradise. Those who fall, weighted by their bad deeds, will remain in Hell forever."

 

[bob x]

So, apparantly using Einstein's opinion doesn't help my case much, even though I agree with him.

Einstein was brilliantly right about some things, but shown to be wrong about some others, quantum indeterminacy being the most famous example. He is arguing that there is no indeterminacy about people, from the premise that there is no indeterminacy about inanimate objects-- but that premise is precisely where he is known to have been wrong. (Of course, the reverse does not follow: just because there is known to be indeterminacy at the microscopic level, it does not necessary follow that there will also be indeterminacy at the macroscopic level; I do not think your position is logically impossible, just unlikely.)

The exact same set of influences in the exact same situation will always produce the exact same choice in the exact same person.

And it seems improbable that I will sway your opinion on this. But at least, do you understand that "The exact same set of influences in the exact same situation does not always produce the exact same choice in the exact same electron"? And therefore that there is nothing logically impossible about such an indeterminacy also being true of people?

As long as superdeterminism remains a VALID escape from Bell's theorem...

It has not been shown that it is or ever has been a valid escape. Bell tried to construct a hidden-variables theory along that line, but never completed one, and we do not yet know whether such a theory is possible. All we know is that it is the kind of approach that Bell thought worthwhile to try (and that Bell was no dummy on the subject; but even Einstein got some things wrong).

if you were never claiming that our choices are not quantum indeterminate then we have no disagreement anyway. Thanks for clearing that up.

Do you have an extra "not" in that sentence? It seems that rather than clearing it up, my attempt to explain just muddled you other. I was never claiming that it was empirically provable at present that our choices are quantum indeterminate; I was claiming that it is empirically provable, and has been for a long time, that some things are quantum indeterminate (which rodgertutt was claiming to be a logical impossibility); and I am still believing that it is probable that our choices are quantum indeterminate, and even that it is probable that this will be empirically demonstrable in the near future.

in my opinion, in this world, we are the chess pieces,
and the laws of physics have everything to do with what moves we make.

We observe that some moves on the board are less probable than others, for example, moves which leave the queen subject to capture. We can easily understand one class of exceptions: a move that leaves the queen subject to capture is more probable when it also attacks the other queen, whether or not an actual exchange of queens follows. Bell was "spooked" by another class of exceptions, when the sacrifice of a queen seems to be "caused" by a checkmate five or six moves in the future; how to explain this? Travel of information backwards in time is what Bell rejected as "spooky". Some kind of "hidden variables" approach where pre-calculations of the possible future outcomes are, presently, being stored somewhere makes a little more sense: that would be the "players" (and whether they are conceived of as "free-will" agents or as sophisticated but thoroughly algorithmic computer programs is actually beside the point here; the "players" are not the "pieces"). Bell's approach was to believe that every move to the end of the game is encoded in the chessboard from the beginning; he never made that work.

But what I have been talking about, really, is the most basic class of exceptions: sometimes a queen is left hanging, for nothing. Introduce "players" and there are all kinds of possible explanations: it's a speed-chess game and the player lost concentration under time-pressure; or the player wasn't very good in the first place; or it's a dad playing a little kid and letting him win, whatever. Rodgertutt insists that there must be a complete explanation looking only at the position of the pieces on the board. That's just wrong.

I'm glad I'm not paying the phone bill

The Muslim missionary hung up long ago; actually we're just talking to the dial tone.

Apparantly, just like in Christianity, there is a wide range of beliefs in Islam depending on differet interpretations of what the Quran means;
a range all the way from ultra-conservative (eternal suffering),
The Afterlife in Islam - ReligionFacts

to liberal (all-inclusive salvation)

I didn't know that "all-inclusive salvation" was believed by any Muslims; I thought they were all "ultra-conservative". So OK, at least I have learned something from this exchange.

 

[Snoopy]

Actually, according to the Quran, pious non-Muslims like Christians and Jews will be going to heaven. Also, the Quran also makes it pretty clear that hell is finite (something I am pretty sure I discussed on the Islam board). So it looks like Islam is already universal enough rodger. ;-)


p.s.

@ Snoop

Kudos for the [FONT=Times New Roman, Times, serif]"THE DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM PHILOSOPHY WEBSITE[/FONT]" link dude. ThanX

Hey can we clear this up? Who or what decides on the piety? You mention Jews and Christians but that doesn't make it universal does it?

I noticed the weblink had an article about Libet...

s.

 

[c0de]

But what I have been talking about, really, is the most basic class of exceptions: sometimes a queen is left hanging, for nothing. Introduce "players" and there are all kinds of possible explanations: it's a speed-chess game and the player lost concentration under time-pressure; or the player wasn't very good in the first place; or it's a dad playing a little kid and letting him win, whatever. Rodgertutt insists that there must be a complete explanation looking only at the position of the pieces on the board. That's just wrong.

Well, you're contending that materially independent factors are somehow interacting with the material, just to give us free will. That sounds just as "wrong" to me (I realize you just are hypothesizing and rodger is not).

I was claiming that it is empirically provable, and has been for a long time, that some things are quantum indeterminate (which rodgertutt was claiming to be a logical impossibility); and I am still believing that it is probable that our choices are quantum indeterminate, and even that it is probable that this will be empirically demonstrable in the near future.

I'll take that bet.

Some kind of "hidden variables" approach where pre-calculations of the possible future outcomes are, presently, being stored somewhere makes a little more sense: that would be the "players" (and whether they are conceived of as "free-will" agents or as sophisticated but thoroughly algorithmic computer programs is actually beside the point here; the "players" are not the "pieces"). Bell's approach was to believe that every move to the end of the game is encoded in the chessboard from the beginning; he never made that work.

If the players were "algorithmic computer programs" then they would be just that: "pieces."

It has not been shown that it is or ever has been a valid escape. Bell tried to construct a hidden-variables theory along that line, but never completed one, and we do not yet know whether such a theory is possible. All we know is that it is the kind of approach that Bell thought worthwhile to try (and that Bell was no dummy on the subject; but even Einstein got some things wrong).

Fine, it's a "loophole" in the system that could work. Theoretical for now, but it's still good enough for me (anyone wanna start where Bell left off?)

Do you have an extra "not" in that sentence? It seems that rather than clearing it up, my attempt to explain just muddled you other. I was never claiming that it was empirically provable at present that our choices are quantum indeterminate;

I thought you were, my bad.

We observe that some moves on the board are less probable than others, for example, moves which leave the queen subject to capture. We can easily understand one class of exceptions: a move that leaves the queen subject to capture is more probable when it also attacks the other queen, whether or not an actual exchange of queens follows. Bell was "spooked" by another class of exceptions, when the sacrifice of a queen seems to be "caused" by a checkmate five or six moves in the future; how to explain this? Travel of information backwards in time is what Bell rejected as "spooky".

Good analogy... I always hated "bob" and "alice".

 

[c0de]

Who or what decides on the piety?

God.

You mention Jews and Christians but that doesn't make it universal does it?

I said non-Muslims like Jews and Christians.

 

[rodgertutt]

And it seems improbable that I will sway your opinion on this. But at least, do you understand that "The exact same set of influences in the exact same situation does not always produce the exact same choice in the exact same electron"? And therefore that there is nothing logically impossible about such an indeterminacy also being true of people?

I fail to see the relevance.
Electrons don't make "choices."
The behaviour of electrons notwithstanding, I still assert that the exact same set of influences in the exact same situation will always produce the exact same choice in the exact same person.

 

[citizenzen]

I fail to see the relevance.
The behaviour of electrons notwithstanding, I still assert that the exact same set of influences in the exact same situation will always produce the exact same choice in the exact same person.

There can be no exact same set of influences in the exact same situation. That would require two people having lived the exact same existence throughout the entire history of space and time.

Even then, if this impossible scenario actually existed, although they most likely would make the same choice, there would be the opportunity to choose otherwise and a probability (however small) that eventually they would, leading to a divergence of their conditions. experience. It may be why we are individuals and not a giant colony of single-minded bacteria. We've already gone through this process and free will has helped lead us to this point we are in today.

 

[rodgertutt]

There can be no exact same set of influences in the exact same situation. That would require two people having lived the exact same existence throughout the entire history of space and time.

I agree with you.
But if that were possible the exact same set of influences in the exact same situation wuld always produce the exact same choice in the exact same person.

Even then, if this impossible scenario actually existed, although they most likely would make the same choice, there would be the opportunity to choose otherwise and a probability (however small) that eventually they would, leading to a divergence of their conditions. experience. It may be why we are individuals and not a giant colony of single-minded bacteria. We've already gone through this process and free will has helped lead us to this point we are in today.

The "point we are in today" is, that during the act of making a choice, it is not possible for you to choose something that is not having the strongest influence on your mind.

I maintain that is logically impossible. Thus, no "free will."

The combined influence of internal preference, i.e. finally deciding what we want MOST after due deliberation, plus external persuasive considerations will CAUSE all choices to occur inevitably.

The exact same set of influences in the exact same situation (if that were possible) would always produce the exact same choice in the exact same person.

That is why it is not even possible to have chosen differently than we did at any given point in time.

This does not diminish our "individuality" one iota.

 

[bob x]

Well, you're contending that materially independent factors are somehow interacting with the material, just to give us free will.

Not just to account for free will (for those of us who believe in such a thing) but to account for any of the quantum-indeterminacies, some form of "hidden variables" are required, which are distinct from, and strictly uncontrolled by, the distribution of particles in space-time.

I'll take that bet.

The mechanism by which quantum-indeterminacies are magnified to create differences at the macroscopic level is starting to be understood. Eukaryotic cells have structures called "microtubules" with charged poles whereby they link and unlink to accomplish basic motions; Roger Penrose noted that in some special microtubules in the neurons, the tubulin acts as a kind of "Faraday cage" isolating the molecules inside from external electric fields, so that the probabilities of discharging-or-not-discharging are not driven to 99.999% or 0.001% but rather are left free. Penrose speculated that, while most neurons base their decisions to fire-or-not-fire on what the synaptically-connected neighboring neurons are doing, some special neurons may be free to fire-or-not-fire based on quantum-indeterminate states of their microtubules, and these would then drive a cascade of neuron firings. Max Tegmark criticized this hypothesis, based on findings that such special microtubules turn out not to be at all unique to neurons, found even in amoebas, so that they can hardly be responsible for whatever is special about human consciousness. I would argue, however, that this may be telling us that even amoebas have some degree of free will, that their decisions to extend and retract pseudopods are not something that a computer program could replicate; they may not have a large scope of action, but the actions available to them are free (prokaryotes on the other hand appear to be pure automata).
We will see: at least I want to make plain to you that when I talk about empirically verifying this kind of hypothesis, I am talking about tangible things which can be researched in the lab.

If the players were "algorithmic computer programs" then they would be just that: "pieces."

Well no, in terms of the analogy they are not "pieces" because they are not "living on the board" and not subject to the "rules of chess"; I am referring to the "hidden variables" which are not material, not directly observable, subject to some different rules which obviously are harder to learn about. Pointing out within the analogy that the "players" might turn out to be computer programs is meant to concede that the hidden rules for the hidden variables might, possibly, turn out to be some kind of superdeterministic system as you, following Bell, think most reasonable to assume; I am conceding that I don't have evidence to rule that out.

(anyone wanna start where Bell left off?)

I commend to you Lee Smolin's The Trouble with Physics, discussing the stagnation of the last few decades. He laments that most physics journals have explicit policies against accepting any more articles about "foundational" problems in quantum mechanics (the whole "what does it all meeeeean?"), and even those that don't hardly publish anything on it, banishing the subject to the philosophy journals; young physicists are discouraged from thinking about it, told instead to just "Shut up and calculate!"

 

[rodgertutt]

Bob, your whole post goes swish, right over my head.

I cannot see how any of it affects the obvious conclusion that during the act of making a choice, it is not possible for you to choose something that is not having the strongest influence on your mind.

I maintain that is logically impossible. Thus, no "free will."

The combined influence of internal preference, i.e. finally deciding what we want MOST after due deliberation, plus external persuasive considerations will CAUSE all choices to occur inevitably.

The exact same set of influences in the exact same situation (if that were possible) would always produce the exact same choice in the exact same person.

That is why it is not even possible to have chosen differently than we did at any given point in time.

 

[bob x]

I maintain that is logically impossible.

It may or may not be true (and the strength of your emotional attachment to the belief that it is not true is duly noted), but it is flatly wrong to say that something is logically impossible, when the precise kind of situation that you are calling "impossible" actually occurs. An electron is highly likely to go with the strongest influence, but has a non-zero probability of going with the weaker influence instead; you may prefer to say that "the will of God" chooses which way it goes, instead of saying that "the electron makes a choice" as I sloppily put it, but regardless of the semantics, your claim that logic forbids this kind of indeterminacy from existing is just not correct. Whether it is true about humans is a separate question (and the strength of your emotional attachment to the belief that it is not true is duly noted), but there is nothing in logic which forces us to believe either that it is true or that it is not true.

 

[citizenzen]

The exact same set of influences in the exact same situation (if that were possible) would always produce the exact same choice in the exact same person.

So first you propose an impossible set of conditions and then claim that those impossible conditions would always end in the same result... which you couldn't possible know, because the conditions for the experiment could never be created... but that doesn't stop you from being sure about the results anyway.

That isn't science. It isn't good logic. That is faith... and will never amount to anything more than blind faith.

 

[rodgertutt]

It may or may not be true (and the strength of your emotional attachment to the belief that it is not true is duly noted), but it is flatly wrong to say that something is logically impossible, when the precise kind of situation that you are calling "impossible" actually occurs. An electron is highly likely to go with the strongest influence, but has a non-zero probability of going with the weaker influence instead; you may prefer to say that "the will of God" chooses which way it goes, instead of saying that "the electron makes a choice" as I sloppily put it, but regardless of the semantics, your claim that logic forbids this kind of indeterminacy from existing is just not correct. Whether it is true about humans is a separate question (and the strength of your emotional attachment to the belief that it is not true is duly noted), but there is nothing in logic which forces us to believe either that it is true or that it is not true.

The fact that it went with the so-called "weakest" influence proved that it was not the weakest influence after all, but rather was the strongest influence.

 

[rodgertutt]

So first you propose an impossible set of conditions and then claim that those impossible conditions would always end in the same result... which you couldn't possible know, because the conditions for the experiment could never be created... but that doesn't stop you from being sure about the results anyway.

That isn't science. It isn't good logic. That is faith... and will never amount to anything more than blind faith.

Nope, that's not faith, it's fact.

During the act of making a choice, it is not possible for you to choose something that is not having the strongest influence on your mind.

The combined influence of internal preference, i.e. finally deciding what we want MOST after due deliberation, plus external persuasive considerations will CAUSE all choices to occur inevitably.

Therefore there is no such a thing as "free" will.

 

[citizenzen]

Nope, that's not faith, it's fact.

You don't understand the meaning of "fact".

Since that's the case...

why should I believe you have even an inkling of understanding of the meaning of "free will"?

 

[rodgertutt]

Here's an interesting question.

Do you think it is possible that a person who has committed suicide could have chosen not to, all influences, or lack of influences being considered?

I don't.

 

[bob x]

The fact that it went with the so-called "weakest" influence proved that it was not the weakest influence after all, but rather was the strongest influence.

In the case of an electron, it is easier than in the case of a person to create the "exact same" situation twice: electrons can only be in a limited set of discrete states, the "orbitals" (defined by integer "quantum numbers"); two electrons cannot be in the same orbital at the same time, but you can certainly put an electron into the same orbital two times, and subject it to the "exact same" influences ("same" up to the limits of what is observable; whether there is a "hidden reality" aside from what is observable is the issue c0de and I have been discussing). You are asserting that both times, the same outcome must occur, but that is simply not true: maybe the electron transitions to orbital A the first time, and to orbital B the second time.

If by some objective measure, the influence driving it to A (say, attraction to some nearby positive charge) is "stronger" than the influence to B (maybe, attraction to a positive charge that is more distant), then if we repeat the test 100 times, we will get A 90 times and B only 10 times, so we say A has a 90% probability. But you are saying that after the fact you will declare that A must have been the "stronger" influence the first time, but B was the "stronger" influence the second time, if those were the results: even though A and B were actually the same both times! This deprives that word "stronger" of any meaning. If we want to assume (and c0de and I, as well as you, both want to assume this) that there really must be some cause which accounts for B prevailing, in the minority cases where it does, then the "strongest influence" (in your sense of "whatever it is that wins") has to be something other than the material observable influence toward B (which is just as much "weaker" than A as in the cases where A prevails), something independent from the material, observable influences.

This is certainly not "logically impossible", because it is actual. I believe that this is also true about people: that the decisive factors can be independent of the material world, and that your belief that current sensations plus internal stored memories plus whatever other material influences are operating will always be sufficient to determine the choice is simply mistaken. The decisive factor is "the will", and it is "free" in the sense that the material conditions do not determine it; such is my belief, which might be mistaken, but is not impossible.

 

[rodgertutt]

You don't understand the meaning of "fact".

Since that's the case...

why should I believe you have even an inkling of understanding of the meaning of "free will"?

During the act of making a choice, it is not possible for you to choose something that is not having the strongest influence on your mind.

The combined influence of internal preference, i.e. finally deciding what we want MOST after due deliberation, plus external persuasive considerations will CAUSE all choices to occur inevitably.

You might call that "free" will.

I can't see it that way.

 

[rodgertutt]

In the case of an electron, it is easier than in the case of a person to create the "exact same" situation twice: electrons can only be in a limited set of discrete states, the "orbitals" (defined by integer "quantum numbers"); two electrons cannot be in the same orbital at the same time, but you can certainly put an electron into the same orbital two times, and subject it to the "exact same" influences ("same" up to the limits of what is observable; whether there is a "hidden reality" aside from what is observable is the issue c0de and I have been discussing). You are asserting that both times, the same outcome must occur, but that is simply not true: maybe the electron transitions to orbital A the first time, and to orbital B the second time.

If by some objective measure, the influence driving it to A (say, attraction to some nearby positive charge) is "stronger" than the influence to B (maybe, attraction to a positive charge that is more distant), then if we repeat the test 100 times, we will get A 90 times and B only 10 times, so we say A has a 90% probability. But you are saying that after the fact you will declare that A must have been the "stronger" influence the first time, but B was the "stronger" influence the second time, if those were the results: even though A and B were actually the same both times! This deprives that word "stronger" of any meaning. If we want to assume (and c0de and I, as well as you, both want to assume this) that there really must be some cause which accounts for B prevailing, in the minority cases where it does, then the "strongest influence" (in your sense of "whatever it is that wins") has to be something other than the material observable influence toward B (which is just as much "weaker" than A as in the cases where A prevails), something independent from the material, observable influences.

This is certainly not "logically impossible", because it is actual. I believe that this is also true about people: that the decisive factors can be independent of the material world, and that your belief that current sensations plus internal stored memories plus whatever other material influences are operating will always be sufficient to determine the choice is simply mistaken. The decisive factor is "the will", and it is "free" in the sense that the material conditions do not determine it; such is my belief, which might be mistaken, but is not impossible.

The so-called "weakest" electron at some point in time became the strongest electron.

 

[citizenzen]

Here's an interesting question.

Do you think it is possible that a person who has committed suicide could have chosen not to, all influences, or lack of influences being considered?

I don't.

No roger, once an act has been committed, it's very difficult to reverse time and choose an alternate course... it's even harder to accomplish when you're dead.

Of course, if you've discovered how to travel through time and rise from the grave, perhaps you should share it with the rest of us.