2. A second critical point is to emphasize the distinction between
ONTOLOGY (i.e., what is objectively the case, independently of our beliefs
and knowledge-claims) and EPISTEMOLOGY (i.e., what we can "demonstrate" that
we know).
A Christian ethicist doesn't (or at least shouldn't) claim that she
can epistemically PROVE the existence of an objective, universal moral code.
Such an approach makes the ontological implications of a philosophical
system dependent upon one's epistemological limits. Christian theism offers
a transcendent and objective ontological ground for morality, even if
arguing for it must "pass through" our epistemology. One can, however,
understand the LOGICAL connection between such an existing transcendent and
communicating God and a universal morality to which all are held accountable
(regardless of their acceptance or rejection).
But to say, as Russell Stewart does, that "since Christian morality
is as subjective as any other [morality], it is just as non-applicable"
fails to recognize this critical distinction between ontology and
epistemology. My ability to "demonstrate" the TRUTH of the Christian system
undoubtedly has a "subjective" component--after all, I am a human "subject"
who reasons! But this fact does not at all make "Christian morality as
subjective as any other." ONTOLOGICALLY, the sufficient logical connection
exists between a transcendent, revealer God and a transcendent and universal
moral obligation. But the ONTOLOGICAL connection between an atheistic
philosophy and having sufficient grounds for universal moral obligation
cannot be found.
This, by the way, is where Peter Grice goes wrong in his little
dialogue between the theist and atheist: (just an excerpt)
Monotheist: I can prove right and wrong to my own satisfaction, since I
believe in God, and can refer all moral questions to Him as
the objective, transcendent moral standard - will you grant
me this?
Atheist: Yes of course, but now it's my turn! I can also prove right
and wrong to my own satisfaction,..."
The monotheist does not (or should not) say or imply that, SINCE the
God-believer can "prove right and wrong to my own satisfaction," all moral
questions have an "objective, transcendent moral standard." This
mistakingly makes the ontological ground of morality dependent upon one's
subjective state and epistemic capabilities.
3. Just because an individual can, given a philosophical system,
provide sufficient personal reasons for not e.g. killing his neighbor does
not mean that the philosophical system offers a logical ground for universal
morality. Just because an individual IMPUTES reasons for morality to a
philosophical system does not mean that a LOGICAL connection is present. To
be more specific: to give an evolutionary basis for a moral act (e.g. not
killing your neighbor), as Glen Morton does by scenario, does NOT mean that
universal morality has been given an evolutionary and sufficient basis.
Glen Morton's "demonstration" "from the evolutionary worldview why
killing fellow humans is wrong" is flawed at several points, including this
one. Even IF he "demonstrated" that evolutionary considerations would
prevent killing SOME individuals--which is MAXIMALLY what he did--he did not
demonstrate anything about the more significant and relevant question of
whether killing itself is morally "right" or "wrong." In part, the problem
is that EVEN IF evolution DID operate in this limited way, it still cannot
say anything about what behavior OUGHT or OUGHT NOT to occur. As a
consequence, it cannot LOGICALLY condemn any behavior. (With God gone, are
we to believe that our behavior now becomes accountable to the "evolutionary
SCHEME of things"?) (Cf Morton's statement: "Without such a selective
advantage, murder provides no benefit in the evolutionary scheme of things.")
Furthermore, to posit that the "scheme" of evolution is to safeguard
one's associated gene pool seems not only extremely tenuous, it misses a key
point. [Note Glen Morton's statement: "statistics show that you are more
likely to kill members of your family than strangers. Thus by killing a
member of your family, you are eliminating your own genes from the gene
pool. Thus assuming your genes are
the fittest, you with your gun have eliminated those fit genes."]
It is tenuous because it posits a "scheme" to evolution in the first
place. Why should EVOLUTION care about what genes survive? And the key
point that is missed is that naturalistic evolution, even if true, can only
describe in the long run of things why some genes survive; it can't be
logically used, E.O. Wilson notwithstanding, to show why any genes SHOULD or
SHOULD NOT have survived.
Glen Morton's second point for why evolution can provide a "good
reason" for murder being "wrong" seems to misapply the very concept of
evolution. [Cf. G. Morton: "ince even a mutant with no legs and an IQ of
50 can pull a
trigger eliminating Einstein, murder provides no basis for natural
selection."]
First, I think it's undeniable that "murder provides no basis for
natural selection." But the REAL question is whether natural selection
provides any basis for murder! Secondly, I don't know why ANY evolutionist
would want to claim that the "fittest" individual ALWAYS defeats the "less
fit." So what if the mutant kills Einstein. In the long run, there will be
other "Einsteins" who will do in the mutant. IN THE LONG RUN, the fitter
organisms will prevail. But even with this understanding, evolution still
can't provide a LOGICAL basis for telling me or anyone that murder is
"wrong"--that the Einstein's SHOULDN'T eliminate the mutants. And it can't
tell me why, if the Einstein's do eliminate the one's with a 50 IQ, those
Einstein's should be held not only morally culpable but punitively accountable.
4. Just because the focus of the thread has shifted some from the
original question of the relationship between evolution and racism does not
mean that the original discussion was "resolved." Brian Harper claims,
however, that since "no one has given any rational arguments as to why the
theory of evolution should be blamed for such things I will consider that
phase of the discussion resolved."
From my perspective (having read all the posts), there IS a
plausible logical connection between naturalistic evolution and racism, and
several posts have helped to bring this to light. And those who have argued
that there isn't any logical connection have not only failed on that point,
they have failed to explain how naturalistic evolution can provide a
justification for (or against) ANY morality. If the discussion has been
"resolved," it's been resolved in favor of those who were contending FOR the
connection.
In a related post, Brian Harper specifically asks three questions
(points a,b,&c). Based on my position as expressed above, I offer my own
brief responses.
(a) How would you answer a person who refuses to accept your
views of morality?
I would say that, relative to the objective nature of morality, it
is irrelevant whether they accept it or refuse it.
(b) How would you answer a person who refuses to accept the
existence of a transcendent moral system?
I would say, once again, that it is irrelevant with respect to its
truth. Secondly, I would contend that they can claim whatever they want,
but their behavior will undermine the very point they profess. They can't
(and don't) live that way when it comes to what somebody does to them or
their wife or kids. So someone who refuses a transcendent moral system is
either saying something IRRELEVANT to its truth or they are INCONSISTENT
with themselves. In either case, it's not a very effective basis for
justifying one's rejection.
Rich Knopp, M.Div., Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy and Christian Apologetics
Lincoln Christian College and Seminary
Lincoln, IL. 62656
http://www.asa3.org/archive/evolution/199705/0241.html